Shoplifting crime losses run at £3 billion a year, according to the British Retail Consortium figures consistently show. Yet recent figures from Birmingham city centre offer a reassuring antidote
Figures from the West Midlands Police retail crime unit at Steelhouse Lane, show that reported shop thefts and arrest rates were both rising until towards the end of the 1990s, but then dramatic changes become evident. Between 1998 and 2001 the annual number of reported shop thefts dropped from nearly 2,500 to fewer than 2,000 ‘ a reduction of more than 20 per cent. Good news. The graph also shows that between 1997 and 2001 the annual number of arrests made by the police dropped from 2,620 to 1,112 ‘ a reduction of some 57 per cent. This is puzzling. The normal expectation would be that crime rates fall when arrests rates rise, with a causal link between them; but here there is falling crime and an even steeper decline in arrest rates. This requires explanation.
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It does not seem likely that Birmingham city centre is any less plagued by retail crime than other parts of the country, so the reason for the 20 per cent decrease in reported crime could be retailers not bothering to report incidents to police. This usually reflects a lack of confidence in the police and/or an unwillingness to bear the costs of prosecuting offenders (attending court and giving evidence). But this would not begin to explain the 57 per cent decrease in police arrests. A more likely explanation is that the retailers have adopted a localised security strategy, not based on the conventional victim-police relationship, and where the retailers take a more proactive and independent approach to managing their own crime prevention interests. To an extent, it reflects the thinking in the recent White Paper on police reform that points to a ‘policing family’ where police and others share crime control responsibilities. In September 2001 Professional Security featured the Birmingham Retail Crime Operation (RCO), and considered localised security measures that are being taken by retailers – ‘exclusion orders’. This gives retailers a new tool to combat crime. The exclusion order prohibits the individual served with the notice from entering any of the premises of the 900 RCO members. A list of all members is printed on the back of the formal notice and stickers displayed on doors and windows ensure that excluded persons are aware of where they are not welcome. Security and retail staff are both made aware of those individuals with an exclusion notice served against them through the distribution of a collection of photographs in an album. When ‘excluded persons’ are sighted they can be asked to leave the premises. As Chris James (Managing Director of RCO Birmingham) explained: ‘You [the retailer] suddenly have got a powerful force; you now have some control over what is happening in the city centre by virtue of the fact that you are not giving the invitation to people who would cause a problem.’ It is important to be clear about the extent to which the use of exclusion orders is having what appears to be a dramatic impact on the number of arrests. The use of exclusion orders dates from June 1999. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of arrests decreased from 1,751 to 1,635 ‘ a decrease of seven per cent; and between 1999 and 2001 the number of arrests dropped from 1,635 to 1,112 ‘ a decrease of 32 per cent.
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Yearly Arrests
YearNumber of arrests
19951751
19962240
19972620
19981956
19991635
20001574
20011112
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Between 1995 and 1999 the seven per cent drop is most probably attributable to retailers’ lack of confidence in the police or police unwillingness to treat retail crime seriously, or a combination (despite the fact that Birmingham city centre does have a dedicated retail crime unit comprising one sergeant and up to ten constables). This represents something of an indictment of the traditional approach to crime control, especially as shoplifting is increasingly acknowledged as not just a none-too-serious, low-level crime and disorder problem, but as a ‘gateway’ crime reflecting serious and prolonged criminality’ where the typical offender will be a young male drug user who will need to generate anything between £80 and £300 per week to feed their habit, and where repeated shop theft, as well as street muggings and burglary, will be used to obtain cash for this purpose. Estimates suggest that 10 per cent of offenders account for half of all serious crime. The recent White Paper on police reform rightly highlights the need for a drive against these ‘serious and persistent criminals’; and it is surprising that retailer-police collaboration in this period is so low.
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Even more remarkable is the accelerating lack of dependency on conventional policing in the period from 1999 to the present – a 32 per cent drop in police arrest rates over a short time. One interpretation would point towards an ever-diminishing lack of confidence in the police by retailers, but another would highlight the ways in which use of the exclusion order has quickly become the first-choice crime control option for retailers and RCO members. There are good reasons why this seems to offer a realistic and feasible approach to the problems of shop theft. To begin with, the significant 20 per cent reduction in shop theft since 1999 probably represents a reduction in the actual criminality as well as a change in reporting practices, although it is not possible to attach a proper weight at this stage to these two interpretations.
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What is certain, however, is that serving an exclusion order is an action that can be taken with immediate effect; it can be taken by the store manager; it involves little bureaucracy; and it avoids the high-cost option of processing offenders through the courts. The attrition between offence, arrest and finding of guilt is substantial. The traditional system never worked well because retailers have never had much confidence in conventional criminal justice. Nationally, out of 3.9 million incidents of retailer-identified theft in 1999 only 119,000 (or three per cent) of offenders were found guilty or cautioned. The shortfall suggests that retail crime prevention initiatives need to be located at store level, where the crimes are committed; and this is just what exclusion orders offer. They reflect the challenge of modernisation made explicit in the White Paper, especially in relation to slimming down bureaucracy and reassigning traditional tasks. The use of exclusion orders empowers retailers and gives them a legitimate stake in local crime control in their area; and this reflects the White Paper’s emphasis on developing a consensus around mobilising civic and neighbourhood services, including crime reduction partnerships, as part of the solution to crime and disorder.
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The use of exclusion orders offers a new paradigm of social control. Under traditional arrangements victims notify the police who conduct an investigation, offenders are occasionally prosecuted, sometimes convicted and even less frequently subject to criminal penalties. The process is reactive, cumbersome and highly uncertain in its outcome. Under new-style arrangements retailers take responsibility; they act proactively and without delay and known offenders are subject to immediate penalty ‘ withdrawal of the owner’s licence to enter the store or a group of properties. In the short period of a little over two years, what is emerging is a new style of social control that is run by and for members of a retail crime reduction partnership. It is premised on an active strategy to ban known or suspected offenders from entering premises; and it means less and less resort to conventional policing.
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Declining arrest rates could also be working in the interests of better and more targeted policing. It could be that the offences reported to the police where the police do attend (currently around one-third of all reported incidents) are the ‘most serious’ incidents. Banning some offenders may allow conventional policing to concentrate efforts. Banning retail offenders is clearly attractive but it is not without its problems. Many offenders operate within a limited local area and become well known to security staff, so they are easy to identify and to ban. They may, however, simply transfer their criminal attention from one store (from which they are banned) to another store (from which they are not banned) within the same retail crime reduction partnership area. Or, exclusion orders could prompt offenders to become more mobile. The serial, semi-professional travelling offender is already aware of the need for crime mobility. This has two major consequences. First, it places a premium on ‘all stores’ within an area becoming members of crime reduction schemes with offender banning. It makes sense to join the scheme; and those who do not remain relatively more exposed to crime. The offenders know this because scheme membership and the use of exclusion orders is well signed in order to maximise its deterrent potential. Secondly, if would-be offenders opt to look further afield for crime targets, this also suggests that would-be victims need to extend their crime protection.
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Successful security policies in Birmingham city centre could mean shop thieves try their luck elsewhere. Enter Business Crime Intelligence System (BICS), an electronic system for collecting and disseminating information about known or suspected retail offenders in 12 areas throughout England, for prevention and detection of crime and criminals, with emphasis on high-value, high-volume, travelling thieves. BICS collects retail crime intelligence to allow crime analysis by type of store attacked, type of merchandise stolen and its value, particulars of the offender’s modus operandi, details of the day and time of attack, and the name or alias of the offender, together with circulation of a CCTV or police photograph and previous retail crime history. The BICS database is installed or is about to be installed in up to 250 town or shopping centres with retail crime reduction partnerships.
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The objective of BICS is to identify and target the most serious, prolific and professional criminals by making information available to local partnerships that will reduce the opportunity for these individuals. It uses a crime intelligence database that enables the electronic transfer of intelligence on known retail offenders. This will allow retail crime reduction partnerships to be more focused on excluding and/or arresting offenders. Project management and the BICS database are provided by Retail Decisions, a supplier of retail crime databases. Evaluation is by the Scarman Centre of the University of Leicester. The Midlands Regional Crime Initiative (MRCI) offers a conduit to other retail crime reduction partnerships. And the whole project is fully supported by the British Retail Consortium (BRC) and police in the 12 project areas. The BICS research covers 32 towns, across seven police areas, including: Birmingham, Bolton, Coventry, Leicester city centre and Fosse Park, Manchester, Newcastle upon Tyne (including Gateshead town centre and Gateshead Metro Centre), Shrewsbury, Solihull, Stoke on Trent, Warwickshire (Leamington, Nuneaton, Rugby, Warwick) and Wolverhampton. It would be naive to presume that the emerging strategy is not without problems. One concern relates to the criteria for issuing a banning or exclusion order and whether the process is open to abuse. Some working partnerships exclude offenders only following a criminal conviction, but the Birmingham model targets offenders who have been caught stealing by store staff. Although the law is clear that the ‘invitation to enter’ is simply conditional on the shopkeeper’s discretion (including a perception of whether the would-be shopper is ‘trouble’ or not), in practice sales and security staff will focus only on the more persistent, high profile offenders. In Birmingham, with the Pallasades shopping centre alone having a footfall of almost one million people per week, it is unlikely that staff will be able to concentrate attention on anyone other than the most prolific of known offenders; and there are powerful commercial disincentives in excluding honest shoppers.
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Another concern relates to the exchange of photographs of known offenders.
Between 36 and 48 photographs a month are being physically distributed to Birmingham RCO members a month. In a little over two years nearly 1,000 images have been circulated. Members collect updates at regular meetings but the physical handling of large quantities of information can cause difficulties; and as BICS comes ‘on stream’ data flow will increase substantially. However, as Chris James, (Managing Director of RCO Birmingham) says: ‘Although there are a large number of both members and excluded persons, there is a great deal of commitment from our members, whether security staff or retail staff. They will endeavour to collect the latest updates and regularly deter those whose intention it is to take goods from our shops. By refusing entry to those prolific offenders stores are saving thousands of pounds each week.’ Such confidence is reflected in the RCO membership. Chris Hobbs, loss prevention manager for GAP, has estimated that reduced loss from theft through the use of exclusion orders had covered the cost of his membership in one weekend. Jonathan Cheetham, manager of the Palisades shopping centre and chairman of the RCO said: ‘We recognise the fact that there are a lot of ‘good guys’ out there, and that we outnumber the ‘bad guys’ by a massive margin. Through the RCO we are harnessing this advantage and through every security guard, shop worker, commissionaire, porter and manager we are creating a safer atmosphere and giving the offenders nowhere to hide.’
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Conclusion
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The Birmingham RCO initiative offers a fascinating example of innovation in crime control. Retailers have seized responsibility for dealing with retail crime: the primary response to theft is to ban or exclude retail thieves; and fewer offences are being reported to the police.
