Private security was conspicuous by its absence from the 157-page report of the July 7 review committee of the London Assembly, published in June.
The hundreds of pages of transcripts of interviews, however, do cover topics about and of interest to private security.
The orderly question and answer of the committee seems misleading when you think of the chaos of finding out what we now know was 7-7, and the difficult job the 999 services had, in, to quote one person in front of the committee, ‘uncharted territory’. In human terms, 7-7 meant some stretched people in the 999 and other services – Supt Malcolm Baker of the Met for instance spoke of 7-7 blurring into a ‘96-hour period’. Topics raised by the review include contingency planning by businesses – not only in case of a terror attack, but a flood or strike or fly pandemic – and what media messages to listen to, to get informed on the day of an incident. The Hilton London Metropole was singled out for praise by the review, as a casualty receiving station for Russell Square bomb victims.
Among people who spoke to the committee were Michael Strefford, Head of Technology Policy, Security and Assurance at Vodafone; Mark Hughes, Group Security Director at BT. They were among telecoms managers who discussed the demands on the phone networks on 7-7. Michael Strefford pointed to the difficulty in reducing mobile calls and texts. Merely to have texted mobile phones to ask people to reduce use in an emergency would have generated more texts and made the service even worse, given that 7-7 saw a doubling of text messaging. He said Vodafone has carried out post-event reviews for 7-7 and 21-7: “We are happy that our underlying principles were sound. We reacted proactively and our whole focus on the day was how can we keep the network up and operating so that the maximum number of people are allowed to make phone calls.”
Business continuity
Mark Hughes, Group Security Director, BT, asked about the lessons of 7-7, replied that telecoms firms ‘working collaboratively is absolutely essential’. He said that 7-7 and 21-7 have really meant that business has taken a keener interest in their business continuity plans and how they react to these types of incidents. As for telecoms, issues include phone capacity in and out of buildings, for resilience of voice and data services; that is, to ensure an organisation can keep using its computers and phones.
Met Police Supt Peter Smith told the London Assembly July 7 review committee of the Family Assistance Centre, at first in the Queen Mother sports centre in Victoria: “The first time somebody came in they were met by a police officer, who brought them through the security arrangements. We had to use tight security because there would be nothing worse than a terrorist getting in there so, unfortunately, they had to be searched and go through arches, but they were accompanied by an officer and that officer stayed with them.”
Operation Griffin
Supt Malcolm Baker, of the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Met Police, spoke of Operation Griffin, rolled out by the City of London Police force within the City; and by the Metropolitan Police on the Canary Wharf peninsula: “It is privately owned and using the guards that are actually employed by Canary Wharf management. It is also, at this stage, in relatively early stages being piloted in the City of Westminster and identifying lessons of how the City Griffin project can be rolled out across London and recognising it is not a one-size-fits-all solution.” Supt Baker appeared to have a shaky grasp of security industry bodies when he added: “Companies are invited into it [Griffin], to make sure that the security guards they have are registered with both the Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) and the British Security Industry Association (BSIA), which is a regulatory body.”
Supt Baker added that the Met is reviewing legal advice about what police officers and what security officers do when Griffin is activated – such as manning of cordons, Supt Baker speaking of ‘issues around engaging private security guards within what is essentially seen as an emergency service function.’ Another strand to Griffin is the bridge call or tele-conference, where police and a company head of security can talk – Supt Baker reported that he took part in one such call. He recalled: “The message that we put out to people was that it was business as usual, that we were responding to the incident and we were trying to establish exactly what had happened and that is very difficult in terms of imprecise calls that came into the emergency services and then just I think the sheer scale of what we were faced with. The information was around business as usual, stay calm, reassure staff and asking employers to do that as well, so within corporate intranet systems, within their own internal communication systems, to reassure staff.”
Colin Stanbridge, Chief Executive, London Chamber of Commerce, told the committee of the need for businesses to have a continuity plan, perhaps a simple document, covering: how will you contact staff; how to find out if they are not on base; if you cannot get into your premises, where will you operate from; and a list of key contacts and key customers, somewhere else besides your office.
Among those invited to speak to the committee were council staff including Anthony Brooks, Head of Community Safety and Emergency Planning Adviser, London Borough of Camden; and John Barradell, Director of Community Protection, Westminster City Council. The report stressed the good work on the day and after, while pointing to shortcomings in the emergency services’ radio and other communications.
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