The grim reality of suicide and other terrorism was laid out for a security management audience in Manchester recently.
As the police speakers admitted, police need security people in a terror (or other) emergency.
The video footage was of a crowded street in Pakistan. Traffic was at a stand-still. Suddenly, the scene blew up. Do you want to see it again? asked the speaker, Metropolitan Police Sgt John McQuillen. He was talking about ‘person borne improvised devices’ – suicide bombers, in other words. The footage rolled again and this time, with Sgt McQuillen’s pointer, we could spot the man who blew himself up, in front of a car. The bomber was seeking to kill a Pakistani minister. The politician survived, but his driver did not. Nine were killed.
Deliver explosive
A Sri Lankan student at the University of Leicester, Arjuna Gunawardena, wrote about suicide bombs in the May 2003 edition of Professional Security. Then we could believe that suicide bombers happened in other countries. After 7-7, the UK has to face the fact that suicide bombing does not only happen in Sri Lanka and Israel. People may blow themselves up – that way, as Sgt McQuillen explained, they deliver explosive to the spot they want to blow up.
Griffin launch
This was part of Greater Manchester Police’s (GMP) launch of Project Griffin in the city. Briefly, the Met began Project Griffin, whereby security managers and staff are briefed in explosives, terrorist methods such as hostile reconnaissance, and security cordons after a terror attack. After 7-7, or some other emergency that requires a cordon and evacuation, police can call on those briefed security people to staff cordons, and work with police officers. As speakers pointed out during at the launch at GMP sports and social club, there is no way that police can put a constable on every corner of a cordon that has a diameter of hundreds of metres in a city centre, perhaps more than a kilometre.
Who was there
The Met’s Griffin has been rolled out in recent months to big city forces. Manchester plans to have, like London, a confidential weekly conference call, between police and heads of security. The Manchester launch was for heads of security and operations people at north west landmarks such as the Trafford Centre, and big employers such as Kelloggs, retailers, and banks, the sort of people most affected by a city centre evacuation. Also invited to the launch were guarding companies: the big national firms such as Initial Security and G4S (Professional Security understands that Manchester City Council is one of G4S’ largest clients); the likes of Carlisle Security, and Wilson James; and local names such as Delta Force Security, and CES (Controlled Event Solutions). Also there were officers from GMP and neighbouring forces, and security folk such as Stephen Clarke, the north of England man for Skills for Security.
How not to
Have you ever stepped out of the cinema after a vivid film, blinked in the light, and taken some time to acclimatise to the real world? Such was the feeling after the Project Griffin launch, at times mentally bruising as the Met Police speakers discussed the threats, leavening their subject with the droll, sometimes disconcerting humour peculiar to people at the sharp end, like bomb disposers. For instance, there was the video footage of a ‘Carry On’ real-life episode of a suspect package in Indonesia. Some in the audience laughed out loud as the scenario unfolded – staff at the downtown office building evacuated – mere yards from their building; and TV camera crews were allowed in, to view the package. A police officer pointed at the packet, even held it as the press cameras flashed. Even the media backed off, sensing the risk. Sure enough, the package blew up and we next saw smoke, a police officer wriggling injured on the floor, and a grim-faced police commander enter the scene. The desk the packet had sat on was broken in two. The audience was not laughing any more.
Recipes on internet
Much of the morning was given over to explosives – what they can do, what security officers or others ought to look out for, and what they should do if they suspect a device. A bomb disposal speaker described how the type of explosive used on 7-7 (a similar type was used in the 21-7 attempt) brings 430,000 hits on a Google search, including ‘recipes’ on how to make that explosive in your kitchen. Such home-made explosive requires a fridge for storage and is incredibly sensitive, according to the speaker – ‘look at its girlfriend in a funny way, it goes bang,’ the bomb disposal man said, in one example of his dry humour. A bomber would need only a small amount of such an explosive, he warned. Nor are terrorists the only potential users; he mentioned Soho nail-bomber David Copeland, and animal rights extremists. As for bomb containers, they can come in all shapes and sizes, from a matchbox to a lorry or car, which with its glass and metal is an ‘excellent’ bomb container (from the bomber’s point of view) because of the fragmentation. As the speaker warned, if security officers are suspicious of something, they must get themselves, and the public, safe. Confirm, clear, cordon and control are the watchwords. That is, call the police; clear people away from the bomb, setting a cordon outwards as you go. Here, the speaker said, was the essence of Project Griffin; there are not enough police officers for an effective cordon at an incident.
Cordons in metres
As a sign of the uncertainties of dealing with explosives, the speaker warned a security officer (or a police constable) standing over a suspect device and using his radio to describe the device; that could trigger the explosion. Rather, the speaker stressed, get out of the way; do not turn out the lights; do not close, let alone lock, doors – because the bomb disposal people do not want to be in the dark; and do not panic. Even for a briefcase-sized bomb, a cordon ought to be 100m away, as a minimum, the bomb disposal speaker suggested. For any bigger suspect device, a cordon ought to be 200m away. The Arndale, Manchester bomb showed the difficulties of enforcing a cordon fully; workmen on a nearby bridge were not told until very late of the danger. The bomb disposal speaker showed video of how he and a colleague as an exercise drove a car into Bishopsgate in the City of London (scene of the IRA 1990s bomb that killed a photographer and did wide damage), and parked it. Inside was what was meant to look like a bomb, made from former Soviet artillery shells. While the speaker admitted that such an exercise had been stupid – that could have got the men killed – his footage of the test showed a pair of police officers walk by on patrol, blind to what appeared to be a car bomb. The speaker’s point: while the IRA had rung a warning to the BBC of their ‘massive bomb’ (and the speaker played a recording), a 7-7 style bomb comes without warning.
What’s in the boot?
And what cordon would we need for such a car bomb? the speaker asked, adding that there was no way of seeing what extra explosives were in the boot. He recommended a cordon of 1,000m, next to impossible to achieve, he admitted. For one thing, there is what the speaker called the British public’s reluctance to believe that there is a need for a cordon, when told. Finally, as an example of the need for all to be alert, the speaker showed video footage of a lorry parked opposite 10 Downing Street, its front blown up in a controlled explosion. In truth, it was not a bomb at all; the driver had run out of petrol and left the vehicle to find some. As the speaker said, the driver should have told police or security staff.
Planning
Next speaker was Manchester City Council principal emergency planning officer Bob Benson, on the city centre’s evacuation plan. He began with the IRA bomb of June 15, 1996, that did £500m damage, damaged 1,200 buildings and left 650 cars trapped for five days. Some 676 businesses were displaced. As a result, the city council mapped city centre zones, to manage an incident. For instance, as a cordon shrank after an incident, named businesses could return to their site, to look at damage. A pager alert scheme followed, and then with Greater Manchester Police, the council set up ‘priority alert’: www.manchesterpriorityalert.co.uk
Small firms
This feeds information from police and council for building managers; about traffic problems, for example; or during an evacuation. Bob Benson said that large businesses were generally aware of such arrangements, and told their local offices to liaise with police. Not so small and medium firms, who did not have the resources to prepare for an incident and evacuation. He suggested that businesses should have a contingency plan, and test it, and make sure that their plan is compatible with council and police planning. For example, if a cordon denies a business its premises, for a prolonged time, the business should have alternative premises planned, outside the city centre; and back up for its records at that alternative place.
More about cordons
After lunch, Insp John Bryce of the counter-terrorist section of City of London Police spoke about cordons. His force’s police and security staff have the same briefing, he said. There is a procedure manual available at the London emergency services liaison panel website www.leslp.gov.uk and a strategic emergency plan at www.londonprepared.gov.uk which covers command and control in an evacuation, dealing with the media, and informing the public. He gave the purposes of a cordon: to keep people out of danger; to speed any rescue; and to preserve any crime scene, for forensics. In a suspected CBRN [chemical biological radiological nuclear] incident, the outer cordon might be 600m, which the City of London Police could not manage, even with the Met, Insp Bryce admitted. And as he showed on a map, such a cordon in Manchester would mean a fair chunk of the city centre, taking in multi-storey and disabled parking. And how to deal with people who did not have English as a first language? he asked. Remain vigilant for secondary devices, he warned; stand behind solid cover, in case of flying glass; and stand away from scaffolding. Whether you are a police or security officer, always think of your personal safety, he stressed. After a detonation, again your first consideration should be your personal safety; because if you become a casualty, you are one less person to help police, and one more casualty to be dealt with. Play safe, he insisted; check for gas leaks and secondary devices, and beware of broken glass. Considering 7-7, he said that your company might not be of interest to a terrorist, but a neighbour or building across the road might be a target. Insp Bryce did add that police would not strip a place of its security staff, and leave it unattended.
Inner and outer
After a detonation, there will be two or three cordons, inner, outer, and for traffic, with differently coloured tape for each. The inner is the first to be cleared. Nobody will go back in, until forensics have finished, and handed the scene back to police. The outer is flexible, Insp Bryce went on, and will depend on street and building layout. A couple of police officers may work with four to six security officers. Normal policing elsewhere has to go on, he pointed out.
About volunteers
He went through some points that crop up at cordons. There are always volunteers, he said; such as off-duty fire, ambulance and Army people, and anyone with a sense of civic pride. On 7-7, Insp Bryce recalled, British Medical Association doctors in Tavistock Square near the bus bomb did useful work. Do not discount volunteers, then; but ask them to wait, and direct them to a police officer. An extra pair of hands may be of use, just to offer comfort to people.
Witnesses
As for witnesses, Insp Bryce admitted the police could do more. Walking away could be injured victims; or suspects. Again, take people’s details, at least a name and phone number, he suggested, and ask them to wait until spoken to by police; chat to them. As for building occupiers, do not let your staff gawp at windows, because glass from other buildings in an explosion may decapitate those people. Move your visitors and deliveries away.
The media
As for the media; they have a valuable job to do, Insp Bryce conceded, but they should not be allowed access without a police escort. For a couple of hours on 7-7, he complained, a totally wrong story was going out, and sowed confusion. The media, he said, had to be managed; and yet, as he admitted, they can reach a scene as fast or faster than bomb disposal. Under the Terrorism Act, he added, police can arrest the media for trying to get inside a cordon. But, he added, try to use reason, because an arrest would mean fewer police available. Police, he said, will try to arrange a photo-opportunity for the media, because, as he admitted, if police do not the media will get one by themselves, getting inside a cordon by the (literally) back door. In short, the authorities have to assist the media, but still keep the crime scene intact. In a final media-related point, he warned police and security staff alike at the scene to be careful of their image. No flippant remarks that could be taken out of context. Staff laughing at a private joke – with terror damage in the background – would look terrible, he said.
Silver and gold
Insp Bryce went through the command structure for a critical incident – gold, silver and bronze; briefly, the thinkers, directors at a tactical level, and the doers at ground level. He asked if your organisation might have the same structure. For instance, on 7-7 a Hilton hotel was used to treat casualties. Someone senior at the Hilton had to make the decision to allow such use of the hotel, and someone on the ground had to make the agreement happen. In the event, one hotel entrance was used for hotel guests, while another was used for the injured. In short, police ‘silver’ commander ought to be able to talk to the private company’s ‘silver’ manager.
High-vis patrols
Equally, whether Project Griffin comes into use at a scene; the police silver commander at the scene will decide if he wants extra resources. He contacts the control room; the bank that controls the central London Griffin database then contacts companies taking part, asking for guards to be released. If a member says it cannot release guards, that is fine, Insp Bryce said. Griffin guards go on outer cordons, supervised by police. As he pointed out, security staff are civilians do not have the power to stop people entering a cordon. Police do not want guards in a confrontation, or accused of assault; instead, he said, guards should stand their ground, explain the incident is serious, and refer people to the nearest police officer. Two or three times a year in central London, Insp Bryce added, police do high-visibility patrols and ask Griffin-aware guards to do likewise: “It’s amazing what a sea of yellow coats does,” he added, meaning that would-be criminals are displaced by the show of patrollers.
Cordon access
The Corporation of London, the local authority in the City of London, runs a cordon access scheme, so that your critical staff – and by critical the authorities don’t mean your chief exec, but structural and air-conditioning engineers, IT staff and electricians – can return to the building to assess. There is no automatic right of entry, and a pass can be revoked at any time.
Watch for a hostile recce
Tom Cotton, counter-terrorism security adviser at the Met, talked about hostile reconnaissance.
Do a google search and you can find an Al-Qaeda training manual. An original was found in Manchester, Tom Cotton added. A terrorist may do a recce to find out the thickness of walls, a building’s structure, to determine the best way to attack, whether by vehicle, person, and so on. Also a recce may seek to find the best time for an attack – perhaps when a building is at its busiest, he suggested. People on a recce will test security measures and staff; they will ‘walk’ the CCTV, to see the response from the guardforce. If there is no response, that is a vulnerability, Tom Cotton said. As for gates, a surprisingly high number of them fail, he added. He warned that open source material may be of help to a terrorist on recce – such as floor plans on the internet. A recce may look outside the target building too, to see how long the street outside is – whether to give a vehicle bomb a good run, or to give a person a better chance of fleeing to safety. The maker of the recce may use maps with lines drawn on; stressing how important it is for a guardforce to respond to suspicious people who may be on a recce, Tom Cotton spoke of how the recce-maker may have cryptic notes; may make sketches; or use binoculars or video-cameras. As he admitted, what if you are guarding a museum or gallery, where every visitor has a camera?! In that case, he added, like any other criminal on a site, the recce-maker does not act like a usual visitor. Does a tourist take an interest in your CCTV?! Or try to disguise himself with a hood or motorcycle helmet? There may be, as before 7-7, a confirmatory recce close to an attack. The actual vehicle to be used as a bomb may drive up and down, as a rehearsal. Is there unusual and significant interest outside a building’s delivery gates, and doors? he asked. A recce may be years before an attack; the terrorists may return nearer the event, to check. Consider your security staff’s routines; should you have alternate security patterns?
CCTV tapes
He mentioned CCTV footage and the 7-7 bombers’ practice run of June 28. Given that the police after the event had some 80,000 CCTV tapes, there could be a problem of finding the practice run, if images are only kept for 31 days.
Tell police
What if you suspect there is a hostile reconnaissance? If it is happening, call 999. If it is reported to you later, call police on their local number; and let police decide if the information is important. He added that police can provide counter-terrorism security advice (CTSA), from mail handling to risk assessment. One port of call is www.mi5.gov.uk where there are documents to download such as ‘Secure in the Knowledge’. Part of Project Griffin is that security staff can make hostile recce reports to police. Raised awareness can also deter walk-in thefts, Tom Cotton suggested.
Suicide bombers
Last but not least, Met Sgt John McQuillen discussed PBIED – person-borne improvised explosive devices.
He began by saying that the (small) security co-ordination unit in the Met’s Counter Terrorism branch dealt with security reviews of sensitive places, and discussed security abroad with the Foreign Office, for example at the recent Turin Winter Olympics. He spoke of a change since 7-7. He denied that Kratos is a ‘shoot to kill’ policy; rather, he called it a strategy to deal with the threat of suicide terrorism, in all its forms, whether by air, person or vehicle. Playing the recorded statement of one of the 7-7 bombers (‘we are at war and I am a soldier’) John McQuillen said: “We are into mass casualties, no warning attack … it is your problem, it could be anybody’s problem.” The potential targets, he went on, are what he called ‘softer’ targets, from stadia to pubs. There is no profile of a suicide bomber, he said; that is, no type of person to look out for. The bomber may be a former low-level criminal, or from a ‘good family’. Equally, there is the behaviour of a PBE [person-borne explosive] to look for: maybe anxious, bulky clothing, mumbling, or praying; but these could be characteristics of people with mental health problems, Sgt McQuillen added. And the device carried could look like anything; here he showed a ‘bra bomb’ from Sri Lanka, inside a woman’s bra. That is, the suicide bomber may not carry explosive in a belt or vest.
Do you have a tannoy?
He went through the power of explosives, and types of detonator. If you have a suspect person, contact your superviser and request police assistance. Confirm the location and description of the suspect. And take cover, if possible keeping visual contact with the suspect; but make yourself safe; or if possible withdraw guards and view by CCTV. Beware, he added, that a suicide bomber may have an escort around, who may overhear a guard’s radio and act. Sgt McQuillen had some questions for a security department: do you have a tannoy, to ask staff to move away from a spot, without alerting the bomber? Can you close lifts, to prevent staff walking into danger? And can you check for further suspects? Do not take any independent action, because a suicide bomber will detonate if they think they are compromised, he warned. Do not put yourself in danger, Sgt McQuillen repeated.
