In this second part of three of Xavier MacDonald’s article on high end jeweller robberies, he would like to address certain received ideas concerning security and which demonstrate why the system will still have difficulties working correctly even if the security professionals learns to anticipate the attacks.
In short, to what extent is the ‘security joint venture’ (the police, jewellery houses, the underwriters, brokers, security experts) a close-knit community based on trust, understanding and communication? Or is each focussing solely on his or her own individual role and on separate agendas? What is the current status of interaction between police, in-house management, security officers and staff?
To predict robberies, local and international police forces must share their information (which is not done) with the establishments since dealing with attacks afterwards is only regressive instead of preventive. The police in general, probably due to their strategy and workload, focus their attention on an incident by collecting video and forensic evidence and eye-witness descriptions to look for leads that will take them to criminals. They thus focus on the crime and not the criminal. They come onto the scene to record that an event has taken place and have little time for proactive work that is needed to apprehend criminals who cause these problems in the first place. Christophe Haget, chief superintendent in Monaco, believes that the “police focus only on solving cases (running after criminals) instead of preventing them from happening.”22 Arguably proactive policing may have little effect on crime reduction or levels but it will keep under a certain control the professional criminals. Since the police mainly come into the picture after a store is robbed, the jewellery houses will end up dealing with traumatized personnel and clients, negative media coverage, loss of goods and an increase in their insurance premium.
Police co-operation also greatly depends on the objectives and priorities given at government levels. Personnel can be given to terrorism rather than to organized crime; drug trafficking rather than armed robberies; prostitution rather than to counterfeiting and so on. High-end jewellery Houses are all insured which does not put them at the top of the priority list which should encourage them to anticipate these robberies by being more proactive. Co-operation between certain states can be problematical due to local legislation, corruption, financing and money laundering. This is, however, one of the important levels where one can nip in the bud future attacks from international criminals. One example of such cooperation was the ultimate arrest of some members of the Pink Panthers. In effect, offenders should be monitored when leaving their countries of origin and the information passed on to the other states and police institutions e.g. Interpol and Europol, national police forces and all the way down to the security managers but this is rarely done except in Monaco where information is always given. In 2009 the Monaco police sent mug shots of members of the Pink Panthers who were reportedly on the prowl to all the jewellery stores. A salesperson called the author informing him that one of the members on these photos was outside the store. The information was immediately communicated to the police who followed them around for a couple of days before arresting them. With the opening of the European borders to other states this will most certainly increase this problem. It is ‘mandatory’ to build very close co-operation with these police forces e.g. access to criminal files before these countries are integrated into the EU otherwise the police forces will quickly lose control. A unified European penal system where the police could have access to information concerning criminals would no doubt help in reducing trans-border crime.
When robbers change their targets due to improved security features, the police have to immediately adapt their strategy to these new “soft” sectors. This keeps the police going round in circles and unfortunately often one step behind. It then becomes difficult for the police to communicate information since they have very little to pass down. Anticipating events rather than dealing with them afterwards will oblige the police to change their strategy completely and to cooperate with the jewellery houses. This should include informing the establishments of criminals in the area and assisting in background checks for personnel and guards working in sensitive areas. Should all the fingers be pointing towards the police or are there other people not pulling their weight?
Meanwhile, the police role aside, what is really going on inside the houses?
Security quite understandably starts at the top of the organisational chart with the President or the CEO who should give clear and precise direction and guidance. He/she has to inspire at all levels and to all his personnel the desire to implement his guidelines and to check regularly that they are carried out. Without the CEO’s personal backing, people will not be fully committed to security and this often leads to problems and inevitably to attacks and thefts. If he/she does not receive the correct backing from hierarchy, the security professional will find himself in a difficult position and in the end will have to beat a retreat. Security is everybody’s problem but the impulse must, first of all, come from the decision makers. The author believes that many losses could be avoided if management were first to understand the risks and personally supported the security policy and manager. A President will talk with shareholders at great lengths concerning strategy, marketing, markets, niches, results, operational margins and EBITDAs 23 but rarely about strategy and tactics concerning security. It is not a question of capacity of understanding, it is just that security is rarely quantifiable, often subjective, not very exciting and can seem complicated which in fact it is not. Since security is not taught in the business schools the decision makers will seldom take the time to understand what security is all about but will often naively and blindly outsource their security decisions to people whom they imagine will do this job and worst of all without controlling. What is the difference between security and safety? This again needs to be explained to management. Fire extinguishers (safety) that work are necessary but will this stop the robbers from attacking (security)? Arguably, the risk of being robbed is low but the consequences for the company can be very high. Let us suppose a client or personnel get killed or injured during an attack – what would the media impact or brand image loss be for the company? Terrible! Thus it is not because the risk of an attack is low that the media and financial impact would not be high. When staff is on sick leave for several months due to post traumatic stress disorder what would be the direct cost for replacing them? These attacks and losses also have a direct impact on the bottom line since deductibles and premiums will increase which will lower profits. Security professionals, criminologists and security experts must educate the decision makers in this field and explain to them that security is not simply a cost centre but can easily be changed into a cost saving centre as well as protecting their bottom line. Furthermore, in certain countries like in France, CEOs are criminally responsible for the death or injury of an employee or a client and will finish up behind bars. Even if it is only for a day or two, this is not an exciting experience.
It is no secret that security expenditure may be under pressure by management and especially CFOs who would gladly take any opportunity to downsize budgets especially when recession can make profits dwindle. One of the first areas for cost cutting is quite naturally for many decision makers – security. Budgets will often be reduced to a minimum until better days and thus audits and training will be limited; hardware and electronic security will not be replaced or upgraded. Cutting back the cost of guards can be done by management to reduce spending since they do not always see the proper use of them but only the immediate savings. The paradox is that when no attacks or thefts take place, senior and middle management and even security personnel begin to wonder whether security expenditure is wasteful or if their job is warranted. Is senior management the only weak link in here?
In fact, more and more people want to do their jobs without being slowed down or bothered by others. In our web-connected world we all seem to be running out of time. Another paradox! We are all snowed under by mails (most of them are unnecessary) and endless meetings. Stylists, store planners and architects are also part of the problem if they do not co-operate with the security manager at the very beginning of the projects. Not sure I want to talk with the security manager who might ask me to modify my floor plan and design and slow me down. Numerous security managers are also often under the control or influence of these people who again often do not understand the risks they can create. The stores indeed look very nice but from a criminal perspective a blessing.
Another aspect of collective blindness is the current lack of method in the selection and motivation of security personnel and staff.
Many security professionals are former police, gendarmerie or military personnel who have been hired because hierarchy think they are honest, reliable, available, etc., but few decision makers will ask themselves if they are competent in this field. Managing a high-end jewellery establishment is different from other retail sectors and hotels and needs special competences, knowhow and skills. Where are the checks and balances, seminars and training for the security managers? Accounts are controlled by one of the Big Four financial auditors; new designs are approved by the Presidents, IT is protected by firewalls but who trains, updates and controls security personnel? Would CEOs outsource finance, accounts and marketing without controlling? Furthermore, people imagine that the security staff in high-end environments are better trained or prepared for robberies and thefts. This again is a received idea since bids are regularly sent out to lower the costs of guards and equipment but worst of all there are no clear security policies. Security professionals need to keep learning, attending seminars since the industry is constantly evolving in order to keep a step ahead. There are no common goals, specific manuals or training for security professionals and neither do they really want them. It is much easier to protect one’s own perimeter (without anticipating) and keep one’s heads deep down into the sand bucket than working collectively. Are we again all running out of time or do we prefer to hide the fact that there is little security in place?
Lastly, many security managers are dual hated- security and facilities to optimise resources. For staff, what is the priority- a squeaky door or a toilet that leaks or security training or following procedures? Facilities management and security need to work together but these positions should be carried out by different persons.
It is a common understanding (another blindness) that people in security must be free from any suspicion since they have been trained to detect future problems and to make the right decisions when they occur. The paradox is that the more we trust people, the more the system is vulnerable and the more they become a risk since they know how the system works and how it can fail. Security professionals can hence clean out their own stores since they are the ones who give access to all the personnel. For the company’s security and their own security due to bribes, threats and of weaknesses in human nature they quite obviously have to refuse themselves full control of security systems, for example any access to safe openings. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies” (“Who will watch the watchmen themselves?)” once wrote the satiric Latin poet Juvenal. Checks and balances have to be put in place to prevent the security personnel and guards from stealing but also to protect themselves from tiger attacks or other forms of pressure (e.g. Toni Musulin a Cash in Transit (CIT) van driver who stole 11.6M€ 15.7M$ in 2009). Giving full control to security staff is a major weakness because one can never know what they do after work; who their acquaintances are or the situation in which people will find themselves tomorrow. What happens when families are taken hostage or when fundamentalists put pressure on families of security staff that have stayed in their countries of origin? Remember, attacks are often done with the help from people inside. Nowadays, according to statistics, a majority of people take or have tried some form of drugs even occasionally, who do they buy these from? Criminals. Criminals will quickly find out where they work and will exploit the information to create trust and meetings will then be set up to gather more information. Criminals will also meet the security officers in their housing estates during soccer, basket ball training, etc. This is what happened in Paris in 2009 to Harry Winston where all the security information concerning the store that was passed on to the robbers, which came from the local guard. Redoine Faïd told the author that “… guards must never be told of all the security measures”24 and must not have access to alarms, CCTV or access control. This has to be made perfectly clear to all the managers and store personnel and that they cannot outsource this responsibility. The author’s general rule of thumb is not to trust people blindly even though security needs trustworthy people to function. This has to be clearly explained to security and sales personnel and that limited access and procedures are there for their own safety and not because of lack of trust.
Trustworthy people in security with low salaries are difficult to come across, seldom stay for long periods and often lead to important turnover. When this happens, not only do people walk away with valuable information, new guards have to be re-trained and this takes time and costs valuable resources. To avoid this, officers have to be correctly greeted onto a site; they have to feel part of the team and especially useful otherwise they will walk away for a 30€ ($50) a month wage increase. The author has unfortunately seen on many occasions security managers putting all the blame on the guard or on the guard company when it is often their fault. A good security team has a good leadership. Some managers even go as far as changing security companies instead of questioning themselves and communicating with the President or the supervisors of these companies to improve the service. By changing security companies the security problem is seldom solved but is often worsened due to management change and personnel turnover. There has to be a win-win situation between both sides and not pointing fingers in one direction or another. Security officers must always be under the operational control of the security manager which includes security training; they become his responsibility and not the security companies who often do not understand the overall problem even though many think they do and furthermore it is not the role of these companies. Unfortunately, similar to CEOs, many security professionals prefer to outsource their responsibilities to third parties which allow them not to be entirely responsible. Guards who are on low salaries should be given bonuses or pay incentives when they report events. This would no doubt help to motivate them, to hunt down suspicious persons and detect incidents.
Hardware, electronic security and CCTV represent one of the most flagrant examples of collective blindness in the luxury trade.
Hardware and electronic technology is of limited use if the correct diagnostic is not carried out and if the correct procedures are not put in place. They are only there to assist people by securing premises at night or detecting events after they have taken place rather than to protect goods and staff during opening hours. They detect intruders, protect safes, control access and film past events. Alarm systems seldom fail by themselves and neither do cameras. When they do, countermeasures must take over until they are replaced or repaired. The first thing a security professional or a store owner wants to put in place is cameras and alarms. Most of their defence is based on this equipment although the author believes that this equipment should be analysed after having a clear strategy to anticipate/understand attacks. It is similar to putting the cart before the horse.
Hardware and electronic technology also advance at such a pace that people often do not understand them anymore but will blindly rely on them, thinking that they are protected which they are not. This power advantage can swing from one side to another; if it is left unchanged this will even in certain circumstances give the advantage to the attacker. If swipe cards, for example, can be used to control people entering, they can also be used by an attacker who can steal one from someone’s handbag or pocket. Where are the checks and balances here? People have to be trained to inform security immediately in order to block these cards and to report incidents when something goes wrong or may seem unusual. It is not difficult for robbers to understand the weaknesses in a system since all is a question of time and determination. The installing of security measures might deter amateur opportunist robbers but not necessarily the professional ones.
The spectrum of hardware and electronic security is enormous. The choice of these systems is governed by cost-effectiveness but often by the security sub-contractor. If the security professional does not know perfectly well what he needs, he will inevitably be sold the wrong product and will even invest in expensive but unnecessary James Bondesque equipment. Salespeople from security technology and hardware companies have sales objectives and will always try to talk clients into buying what they want to sell them and not what they really need. Sub-contractors often, unfortunately, do not listen to what the customers want or need and worst of all can frighten them into buying the wrong equipment. High-end jewellery Houses have different needs from luxury stores which sell clothes, shoes and handbags. Jewellery Houses sell and handle precious stones, watches and jewellery which are rather small and would not be picked up by the ordinary wide-angled cameras that the retail stores would need. Many sub-contractors are not aware of this and will install inappropriate equipment and often placed in the wrong places. Since technology evolves rapidly, constant re-evaluation is necessary to defeat crime. The security manager must keep abreast of these changes by attending security fairs and by reading. He must also avoid security companies that sell equipment that cannot be serviced or upgraded by other companies otherwise he will have very little room left to manoeuvre.
Hardware
Hardware will also rapidly evolve over the coming years and it is wise to buy good quality hardware (safes, locks, glass, etc.) simply because the equipment that will open or break into them will also evolve but at a faster pace. Most vaults and safes can be broken into by skilled robbers, an employee under threat or recently turned criminal. What can be seen as a good protection safe or display window today will most certainly be easier and easier to break into or cut through tomorrow. Spending the extra cost for quality hardware will in fact save money in the medium-long run.
When talking with installers or manufacturers of hardware, the author sees that they always focus on their product but not on the global security picture. Installers, for example, of cabinets and counters focus on how difficult it is for robbers to get hold of the products. Alarms, toughened glass, security locks and access controls are installed and even armour plated sheets that pop-up in case of an incident. They focus so much on the product itself but little on the personnel who open them or on the global security picture. A display case is only a small part of the defensive system. The author spoke with an installer who argued that the robbers would ask staff for the keys or swipe card to open the showcases themselves (which they will not) or that personnel would instinctively set off alarms (which they do not). The robbers would simply ask the staff to open them or smash them with a sledge hammer. When people have a weapon aimed at their heads they naturally comply with robbers and so they should. Setting off an audible alarm would create panic; a silent alarm would not stop the robbers since they know they would have sufficient time to take off. Roger Matthews also justly believes that this will “…result in the escalation towards more serious violence”25 if robberies are made more difficult. If robbers are trapped in a store they are more likely to use violence against personnel. This has to be seriously taken into consideration when putting in certain security equipment. The author believes that there must always be a means of letting criminals go but that foreseeing these attacks well in advance is more effective.
CCTV
Since one cannot document or measure events that have not yet taken place, the CCTV (Closed Circuit TV) can only focus on the footage seen after an event has occurred. The author believes that CCTV is of limited importance if a criminal is decided to attack or steal. It can have a certain deterrent effect on some of them and especially prevents would-be thieves or robbers from going into action. Those who are afraid of being detected and caught on CCTV will probably move on to a softer target although it is not yet proven that, in the mind of the criminal, being caught on camera means being prosecuted. There are four hundred security cameras in Monte Carlo. It is probably the world’s safest and richest square kilometre. Neither this not the police substation located in front of the store deter the Pink Panthers from attacking the Ciribelli jewellery store in June 2007 and taking off with one million dollars’ worth of watches24. This once un-attackable fortress revealed its cracks. The same robberies also took place in all the major capitals in the world – London, Paris, Basel, Geneva, New York, Tokyo and Dubai. All their faces were caught on tape but few finished behind bars! Having cameras and alarms may not stop determined robbers but may contribute to keeping honest people honest by reducing temptation.
Cameras have never been seen arresting criminals or sending out an audible warning and neither do they detect attacks in progress. The only way of stopping crime while it is occurring is to have the live pictures monitored by competent people but this in the jewellery trade would be too costly except during opening or closing of stores and high-jewellery cabinets. Security managers must control all footage and pictures that go out-of-house including when using IP addresses. Hackers can easily enter, view and remotely control pictures especially of access control and safe areas. One could even find one’s pictures on You Tube! A recent article in the N.Y. Times reports that hackers gained access to the retailer’s records through its heating and cooling system! In other cases, hackers have used printers, thermostats and videoconferencing equipment. Is your security department’s data protected?
Video footage is however valuable for the police to identify criminals who have robbed a jewellery store or have stolen goods by sleight of hand and can be used as evidence to prosecute them or to link different incidents. Video data is especially useful if store personnel or security officers have spotted people who exhibit odd behaviour. Pictures can be sent to other stores or houses, to the police, the underwriters/brokers and to the security experts. This is very important since it can be used for early detection to outstrip the robbers during the planning phase of their attack. Cameras – like cars – are not long-term investments whereas good safes and sound procedures are.
It is important, as Sun Tsu once wrote, that one needs to know one’s enemy and know oneself if one is to succeed in anticipating attacks. In fact, we are our own enemies concerning the risks of an attack because we often refuse to accept things as they really are.
V.ANTICIPATING ATTACKS
It may be difficult to predict exactly when establishments will be hit but there are periods in the year and occasions when the risks greatly increase such as Christmas, St Valentine’s Day, Easter, etc, and where high values are in the stores. Statistically, there are more attacks during opening and closing times but attacks can also take place in the winter period when there are high values in the stores, when the days are short and rainy but they are also carried out during the lunch breaks, during the summer vacations when part-time personnel and replacements come in but who are not very familiar with the stores and security procedures. These robberies can practically take place at any given time whether in the stores but also out of them. Anticipating attacks is controlling what’s happening inside the establishments but also seeing what’s going on outside of them as well as when goods leave the premises.
The security officer’s role does not stop at the door but goes beyond the outside perimeter. They are not doormen who simply bow and scrape the customers in. Guards must control what is going on outside the store to see if anything is suspicious, if people are taking photos, are loitering and noting car number plates, etc. There are signs outside of the stores that indicate that something is going on. Suspicious events and people outside the stores are good indicators that something is happening. Does anybody notice this and report this and do the stores inform the neighbouring stores?
The importance of profiling needs to be understood.
In the western world we are raised to believe it is impolite to closely observe other people. We are taught that an honest person only needs to look at another person’s eyes. Even then, that too can be considered intrusive. Passengers in the metro for example are mostly either texting on their cell phone, reading or lost in their thoughts. There are two cultural exceptions to this general rule – the policeman who must remain “situationally aware” in order to survive on the street and the criminal who must always be on the lookout if he wishes to make a score. In the security world, it is exactly this common “cultural aberration” of the cop and the robber which must be systematically instilled in any guard, surveillance force or staff. As an example, one may imagine that the problem of an armed robbery begins solely the moment the robbers enter the main doors of the premises. In fact, they may well use other entrances by suborning help of people inside the company. That of course entails previous groundwork on their part and a degree of on-site “innocent” surveillance. Who among the staff, not just the security staff, noticed any indicator of such activity and if noticed did they have the training to recognize them and to report them?
Profiling can also be subjective since it is also based on general appearance and behaviour. It does, however, allow in a few seconds and through attitude and speech to have an intuition, whether confirmed or not, that something is unusual. A normal customer will not notice or take this badly but robbers and thieves on the other hand and especially during the reconnaissance phase will not take this too well and will understand that their chances of success are low. Criminals have to understand that the security measures and procedures will make an attack difficult. This is where foreseeing attacks and countering them starts and this is well before they actually take place. If we agree to this, where does anticipating attacks start at the operations level?
Access control is taking the extra seconds before opening the door of a store and looking if one or several accomplices are in the location. Guards and staff must be told to press (although they will rarely do it) the silent panic button when they have a doubt and not keep them in their pockets or behind counters otherwise they will not be able to use them or even worse they will always be afraid of using them. They must fix the customers in the eye before opening the door to see if they look at him or if they have an evasive look, wearing wigs, false moustaches and other props. Customers wearing hats, gloves, sun glasses are a good indication of somebody trying to conceal his identity and should be removed when entering a store. For the attack they will disguise themselves with kippas (Jewish skullcaps), change their accents, dye their hair, wear gloves, use wheelchairs, dress up as delivery men, policemen, sheiks, anything that will help them get in through the front door without giving the alert. It could simply be a film star or a head of state trying not to attract attention but it can also be a robber trying to enter to attack or carrying out a reconnaissance. Security measures must take over immediately at the slightest doubt and personnel must be trained to develop their intuition. Once customers have entered the store, they have to be invited to leave their shopping bags, umbrellas, crash helmets, etc., at the entrance. A real client will only think that the service is premium and not notice anything odd or feel aggressed. Clients worldwide know that there is security and accept it for their own safety. A criminal however, would react adversely and this would score badly on his audit form. All these precursory signs have to be picked up by the guard and the personnel before opening the door or whilst they enter but are these sufficient to stop robberies? Very often, security professionals only train personnel of what to do if an armed robbery takes place instead of anticipating an attack by looking for signs during the reconnaissance phase. This is the phase the author believes will make the difference between being robbed or not.
Criminal reconnaissance is another aspect of any potential attack which needs to be understood. Security professionals who know what they are up against, can think like criminals, can constantly observe evolving modes of operation will allow to detect or deter them during the reconnaissance phase. This is where the author believes it all starts and not when criminals turn up at the front door. Robbers of high-end jewellery stores will take all the time that is necessary to analyse a site and find the best way to succeed. This is the reconnaissance and planning phase where they will observe every detail and every weakness in the system and this is where the security manager must anticipate their moves. Criminals carry out a reconnaissance weeks beforehand of both the store and its surroundings and it is this phase the author believes is crucial in warding off an attack and not whilst it takes place. They have to perform a reconnaissance of the store to make sure their chances of success are high by gathering overt and covert information. Robbers will need to find patterns because “routine and complacency is a killer within the industry”26. Schedules of arrivals and departures will be recorded; nicknames will be given to personnel- the fat guard, the blonde lady, the old man, etc. Every detail will be soaked in. Untreated, crude information will be collected, analysed, processed and put together into confirmed intelligence. Little by little, piece by piece, they will put together their robbery puzzle because on D-Day their heist has to be over in minutes and that they must succeed. Anticipating these attacks and avoiding them is constantly to break these patterns during the reconnaissance phase whilst they detect the weaknesses – changing itineraries; having different or several people opening the store; regular police patrols especially during opening and closing times. A person working for these establishments but observing at a distance the perimeter but not going into the store; different times for taking lunch and coffee breaks, etc., “impromptu and random and unexpected behaviour”.27 This is what robbers detest the most since they “cannot operate”.
The main role of the security professional, guards and sales personnel is to avoid these attacks by making the robbers and thieves go elsewhere down the street or do other criminal activities. If criminals during this reconnaissance phase understand that security procedures are tight, that there are no important weaknesses and that the risk of failure is high they will certainly think twice before hitting a store. Personnel in stores have to make offenders understand that there is a symbiosis between the guards and the salespeople. A glance between both parties and a simple verbal code is enough to show that there is a problem and the criminals will pick this up. People in stores must look out for each other and this is why team work is essential. Salespeople and guards must be told about the reconnaissance phase and how to report suspicious attitudes – clients giving odd answers to questions; requesting to see lots of different high value pieces, etc. They have to understand that tight security measures and procedures are essential in making would-be attackers go elsewhere. “If you look the part and are professional, then the assailants may look elsewhere”.28 Criminals will also choose more vulnerable and compliant victims to increase their chances of success and these will also be identified during the reconnaissance phase. Salespeople and security officers not showing vigilance and who do not show that they are following procedures are what criminals are looking for. This will be noticed immediately by robbers and no doubt this will be ticked off on their ‘criminal’ audit sheet. John Shaw, a loss adjuster, believes that all jewellery Houses and stores are reconnoitred at least twice a year.
The author has hence tugged the analytic line back to the reconnaissance phase which robbers carry out instead of focussing all his efforts on the immediate entrance of a store or during the attack because he believes this is too late. When interviewing victims or guards after a robbery took place they often told the author “I thought something was odd”, “He did look suspicious” or “I just wanted him to go away”. In case of an attack and what really takes place in the jewellery houses is that the officers at the door and personnel will follow procedures by not trying to stop the criminals that have entered and pulled out weapons so that clients and personnel do not get injured or killed. Under no circumstances are they to counter them in any way even with a threatening stare. Guards and store personnel have to be submissive, their lives and those of their clients can depend on this. The criminals also know this and this is the reason why the security professional must focus upstream to avoid them entering altogether. As we have seen, there are robberies inside the stores and how to counter them but they also take place out of them.
Jewellery houses do not have infinite sets of very expensive jewels worldwide at the same time and in all the stores. The goods move to where the clients are and will leave the main capitals in the summer period and migrate down to the French, Italian or Spanish Riviera for client presentations because that is where the millionaires are located for their summer holidays. Other periods which are favourable for robberies and thefts are the festivals, exhibitions, temporary stores in ski and summer resort towns, client presentations on yachts, private events in hotels and villas. The transport of goods to and from wealthy clients by car, train and plane are a serious danger because the goods leave a ‘supposed’ safe area and travel into a hostile environment. Wealthy clients want to see the goods immediately which oblige the jewellery houses to hand carry the goods at the very last minute.
Of course it is not only the immediate entry of the store that is an issue but also the broader context of “outside” such as film festivals events, presentations, etc. The Cannes film festival, for example, is a danger where the latest collections of goods are loaned to A-list film stars and celebrities to walk up the red carpet and attend the different events after the film presentations. Dozens of communications and security staff run up and down the Croisette with millions of Euros worth of goods from the stores and hotels to the celebrities rooms and events so that they can make their choices and the robbers know this. In 2013, two incidents took place during the festival when goods worth 800K€/660K£, on the first occasion, were stolen from a room safe in a hotel in Cannes. The thieves simply opened the room’s door using an electronic key card and walked out with the safe! Why were the goods left in a hotel room safe especially since the goods are never insured when left unattended in these premises? A week later a necklace reportedly worth €1.9m/1.5M£ vanished during a celebrity party at the five-star Hotel in the resort town of Cap d’Antibes. All these robberies seem like child’s play and they are since there was little violence, few witnesses and over in minutes. These thefts were highly predictable but who was in charge of coordinating overall security?
Workshops, sub-contractor workshops and photo shoots are also a great risk since they make and photograph many of the latest collections of jewellery sets for all the houses prior to the collections being presented during the two fashion weeks and events such as the ‘Bienniale des antiquaires’ at the Louvre museum. If robbing a jewellery store in one of the major cities may seem complicated for certain criminals, the sub-contractor workshops are a very easy target and also get robbed regularly either directly or indirectly by performing sequestrations (tiger attacks). Outsourcing goods to third parties is necessary but one cannot just hand them over even if consignment forms are signed hoping not to be affected. People naturally prefer to pass off their responsibilities knowing perfectly well that these third parties are rarely well protected or insured. We all seem to want to give a part of our problem to others so as not to take all the blame. It seems fairer to share incidents because we refuse to see or admit what can and will happen. It’s not my fault, it’s his!
CEOs and security professionals must limit visits to the workshop and sensitive areas as well as pictures that can give valuable information concerning access control, safes, CCTV and alarm systems. The author regularly sees documentaries concerning sensitive sites on television where the owners or the press walk camera crews around sensitive areas without informing them of what is forbidden to film. These inside shots are perfect for criminals who only need to download the footage and work on them. By not controlling these pictures these companies will inevitably be attacked and put personnel at great risk. Google Earth or Mappy will also be used to analyse the roofs, escape routes and the surroundings.
