Matthew Fields, pictured, writes about ways to determine the outcome of hostage negotiations through proof of life video messages. Matthew’s a former Met Police man, now a member of the Security Institute and is a Chartered Security Professional (CSyP).
Introduction
Terrorist hostage-taking can be broadly placed into three categories. Firstly, there is hijacking, where hostages are held under duress but the main goal from the terrorists is something other than killing the hostages. Most notably the Al-Qaeda inspired September 11th attacks, where planes were hijacked and flown into iconic buildings, fits this category. The second type of attack is a barricade-siege, whereby terrorists invade a building in order to kill or hold people hostage. This type of incident will inevitably involve a quicker response from the authorities and a stand-off which would generally create a lot of media attention. A good example of this was the Bataclan theatre siege where Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inspired terrorists, attacked a concert that was in full swing and murdered 90 people and injured many more. Security force response and subsequent intervention produced maximum publicity worldwide, before the terrorists were killed by the authorities. The third type of terrorist hostage-taking is kidnapping. This is different to the first two categories in that is normally a pre-planned activity involving the instigation of demands or concessions by the hostage-takers.
The differences between the categories of terrorist hostage-taking and so-called ‘criminal’ hostage-taking are largely because of government policy. Many states will dictate a ‘no concessions’ policy towards terrorist groups but remain neutral in terms of criminal hostage-taking cases. What is certainly seen is that the lines between terrorist and criminal kidnapping can be blurred. However, hostage-takers are believed to be rational actors who require a benefit to offset the costs incurred by the hostage taking. For example, it could be argued that the industrial-scale of hostage-taking by ISIL, during the 2013-2014 conflict in Syria, used the American and British hostages as political pawns. Although there were ransom demands made, they were unrealistic and designed to apply further pressure on authorities to enhance the propaganda campaign.
The analysis of terrorist behaviours exhibited may be able to point investigating authorities towards a likely conclusion. This can be extremely useful for decision makers, in operational contexts, in their assessments of these cases. It also provides families of the hostages with reassurance or gives a reality in the likely outcome of events.
A proof of life (POL) message is associated with kidnap and hostage taking across the world. It is a recognised norm of the hostage-takers reaching out to the victim communicators (persons receiving the demands) to communicate that they have the person(s) under their control and that they are still alive. This POL can be in variable formats, by picture, video still or footage. Associated within the POL video, may be a POL question. This is a recognised form of proving that the hostage is still alive in kidnapping cases. Where the proof of life message is not offered or available, then certain questions, that only the hostage would know the answer to, can be communicated between the victim communicator and the hostage-takers. The answers, if provided, will then be assessed as to credibility and provide a form of reassurance that the hostage is alive and in the control of the hostage-takers whom are communicating. Often, there are third-party intermediaries involved within this process.
This study sought to examine a sample of POL videos for their narrative content and assess whether recurrent themes (i.e. independent variables) in their content have a bearing on the outcome. The dependant variable is dichotomised into two categories, killed or released.
Methods
The videos were selected from hostage-takers whom represented or purported to represent terrorist groups. All videos emanate from either conflict zones, or areas of the world where terrorist groups control ‘ungoverned space’.
Some 51 POL videos were transcribed and coded; 41 categories were recorded and analysed.
Results
In total there were 62 hostages. The hostages kidnapped in this sample were predominantly males ranging in age from 23 to 70 years. The videos were sub-divided into which terrorist / hostage taking group produced them: Al Qaeda (including aligned and sub-groups such as AQIM, JNIM, AQAP etc) 32pc, Taliban (including both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani Network) 18pc, ISIS 14pc, Asaib al Haq 10pc, Boko Haram 8pc, and Abu Sayyaf Group 4pc. The remaining 14pc were from other terrorist groups. In terms of killed, Iraq (78pc) and Syria (70pc) both had the highest death rate. Of the Afghan and Malian videos examined, there were no fatalities to date. Interestingly, both Afghanistan and Mali have had hostages held for the longest duration (five years and five and a half years respectively).
In the majority of the videos, the hostage is speaking alone. Just over a quarter of the videos, both the hostage and hostage taker(s) speak. On only two occasions did the hostage taker speak on the video alone. This was from the same terrorist group (ISIS) and the same hostage taker. Therefore, it is quite rare to see the hostage taker perform a narrative alone. It should be noted that on both of these occasions, the outcome was death.
It is important to use the results obtained from this study as information of tendency rather than as a guide. The idea of this study was exploratory in nature with a view to future cases. Due to the dramatic impact decisions regarding hostage rescues, by decision makers, may have on cases such as these, it is important to understand these results in the context of each case and the ‘frame’ they are delivered within. Therefore, the results identify a causal relationship albeit a significant positive relationship. It should be apparent to the reader that this will be taken into context within the whole context of the investigation and circumstances at that particular time. Political relationships and snapshots in time play an important part of any response mechanisms as well.
“The hostage was killed more often if the narrative included the facts that the future relied on the next decisions that were made by a government or political figure”
A message of this kind could be deemed a defensive threat. This could also be viewed as an unsubstantiated demand, that the decision is on the government rather than the hostage takers. It could also be viewed as a veiled deadline, in that it is time limited to the government it is directed at, to make a decision one way or the other. It does not necessarily allow for decision inertia. Hostage negotiators are trained that if a ‘toxic trio’; threats, demands and deadlines exist, then this can significantly raise the risk in a situation. This particular theme was predominantly from the ISIS videos, which involved one hostage taker. The behaviour and narrative of that hostage taker is rational, goal driven and can be described as instrumental in nature. The statistical tests carried out suggest that where a veiled threat about a government or political figure making decisions or the next move from this sample, there is a high likelihood that the outcome will be death.
“The hostage was killed more often if the narrative indicated that the situation was worsening or the hostage was pleading that they were in serious and perilous danger”
This narrative theme identified was also predominant in the ISIS videos. There were two Iraq videos and all three Yemeni videos where this theme was apparent. Four different terrorist groups were involved in these kidnappings. The narrative was from hostages pleading in the POL videos. The themes incorporated a ‘last-ditch’, desperate measures, plea to save them. They talked about their life being in serious danger or peril and that they thought they were about to die. Caution should be applied to these results from the narrative study. It cannot be ascertained, with the information presently available, as to whether the hostage takers directed the hostage to plead in this regard.
The content analysis characteristics add to the understanding of investigators. Demands were predominantly directed at governments (92pc) and were political in nature. Significant amounts of demands were for the swap of prisoners. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that a terrorist organisation will make demands towards governments. A quarter of the demands also incorporated a ransom of a significant sum (ie. millions). Two points are worthy of note regarding the payment of ransoms. Firstly, they are generally never paid at the opening offer and will be reduced by negotiation. Secondly, all of these demands are in the region of what is known in the trade as an ‘unrealistic demand’; that is one where only a government would be able to pay due to the size of the demand. Empirical evidence suggests that both sides know it is illegal to pay ransoms to terrorist groups in any event, so it is possible that the hostage takers’ intention is to demand an unrealistic amount and then use this as justification to kill. This tends to suggest that a realistic demand (i.e. money) would probably signal an intent to release the hostage whereas something totally unrealistic (ie. the US out of Iraq) would lead to death.
The time spent in captivity was analysed across all POL videos. It was found that captives were held for the longest periods in Afghanistan and Mali. More hostages seemed to survive after being held for longer periods. No discernible conclusions can be drawn from these facts due to the small sample size but on the basis of these two countries and sample alone, it would tend to suggest that the longer a hostage is held then the more likely chance they have of survival.
Positioning was another factor of note. All POL videos examined where the hostage was filmed kneeling were killed. This would tend to suggest that where a POL video is shown and the hostage is filmed on their knees (and in a pleading, submissive manner), that the outcome may be more likely to be death.
The majority of videos showed the hostages alone. Where the hostage-takers were seen in the videos then there was found to be a higher likelihood of death as the outcome.
The study did find a relationship between death as an outcome with the hostage taker(s) shown in the video, weapons pointed at the hostages, deadlines being given (for the demands), threats made and the wearing of orange jump suits. Again, a significant proportion of the video containing hostages wearing orange jumpsuits were from the ISIS videos, with one further in an Iraqi POL video.
The findings indicate that terrorist hostage-takers do use scripts to deliver their messaging in POL videos. These schemata are mixed and somewhat complex across groups. However, where the scripts involve the categories outlined above there does appear to be a tendency that the outcome is likely to be death.
About the author
Matthew Fields has recently retired from a 30-year career with the Metropolitan Police. He worked in the Met’s Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Unit for a number of years, where he advised the UK Government on hostage negotiation and terrorist hostage-taking cases overseas.
This is an abridgement of a larger piece of work he did towards a master’s degree in high risk operations and governance, through the University of Liverpool, a course typically for those in law enforcement and the military. If that sounds of interest, you can email Matthew – [email protected].
