Stephen Taylor’s essay, written as part of a criminology and politics degree at the University of East London, continued.
In applying theory to examine the panic that informs and justifies the new emergency legislation, an examination of both the evidence for the terrorist threat faced by the UK, and the media presentation of that threat is necessary.
Martin Bright, the Home Affairs editor of The Observer, gave evidence on the scale of the terrorist threat faced by the UK (on which the Home Secretary’s case relies), at a SIAC case for detainees held under the ATCSA 2001. A court document from the case, released online by the Observer Liberty Watch Campaign , reveals how Bright, as an expert-witness, assesses the substantiation of the threat by evaluating the quality of the ‘evidential’ media reports used by the prosecution.
In his presentation, Bright states how that the largest volume of material he has seen (apart from a small number of government documents) falls into the category of press cuttings, and that these, taken collectively, are intended to present the following:
? That there is a threat to international security from Islamic extremists
? That al-Qaeda are at the centre of a "loosely allied Islamic terror network"
? That there is a ‘British connection’ to this network that justifies the imposition of a state of emergency
Bright then explains the difficulty of establishing facts concerning the Islamist threat, evidence of which, he says, is often drawn from press-cuttings. We also learn that many of the cuttings are themselves based on off-the-record briefings from the police and intelligence services. Despite these being impossible to scrutinise, they soon becoming "common currency" among journalists. These factors have led to the reliance on an "increasingly narrow set of sources", with information starved journalists having nowhere else to turn to. This highlights the ‘circularity’ which limits the investigative powers of journalists, and ultimately allows evidence to be used which is impossible to cross-examine.
The unofficial mechanisms that exist between the intelligence services and the media, serve as the method for the dissemination of the unofficial briefings. In summary, both MI5 and MI6 now have an unofficial press officer, and each of the national newspapers designate a journalist to deal with this person (Martin Bright, in the case of the Observer). The designated journalist is then given a contact telephone number and the name of the individual intelligence officer. We are informed that whilst ‘special relationships’ do exist between journalists and individuals within the intelligence services, it is assumed that the same MI5 press officer deals with the designated journalists at all of the other newspapers. This individual acts solely as a representative of those who deal specifically with the Islamist threat within the intelligence services, and therefore the individual has no specific expertise in Islamic or Arab affairs.
The court document then explains how, particularly since September 11 2001, newspapers have become increasingly reliant on these briefings from ‘Whitehall’ sources, and how, prior to the internment legislation, they have been used to prepare journalists for what was to come. At no point does Bright question the validity of the claims, but what is central to his analysis is the lack of scrutiny that can be applied to them, simply by virtue of their being ‘Whitehall’ sources. It was this court document that led to my initial contacting Mr Bright to arrange an interview, to discuss some further questions that presented themselves, namely as to whether this relationship had developed in any way, the ongoing relevance of media control, and whether the simplistic nature of the briefings (in terms of their actual content) did anything to fuel the controversy surrounding them.
I interviewed Martin Bright at the Guardian on March 16 this year. The following summarizes the main issues raised in the interview , and reflects on their relevance in relation to media theory.
The interview opened with a discussion on media and intelligence service interaction. It appears that the relationships between the media and the security service are neither formal nor informal. Such relationships tend to be highly confidential. Furthermore, since 2002, the intensity and simplicity of the briefings given by the intelligence services to the media has increased in accordance with the intensification of the terrorist threat. In addition, sometimes the "unofficial channels" suggest to journalists to tone down what they are being told. On the other hand, journalists sometimes put unanswerable questions to the intelligence services, and assume the worst from their silence. For this reason it is "over-simplistic" to refer to the intelligence services as "the forces of darkness" and journalists as ‘the enforcers of good’. As an example of this, Bright used the "MI5 foils poison-gas attack on the Tube" story where a potential attack was apparently thwarted by MI5. The claims, however, were later found to be unsubstantiated. Gareth Peirce, solicitor for one of the suspects, said: "There’s been a quite extraordinary tidal wave of completely contemptuous and prejudicial coverage of this case", and she continued that the media were "publishing completely manufactured information and stories…" .
The media theory previously examined, particularly the ‘news management’ techniques presented in News, Public Relations and Power , demonstrates how information can be used as ‘currency’. This refers to the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, which allows transactions to be made with information, in return for compliance. In the case of the government, the centralisation of its means of dissemination undoubtedly results in more effective ‘management’, and infinitely better returns.
This cost/benefit analysis treatment of the government’s use of information is normally associated with news from central government. A majority of the principal news stories concerning terrorism and the terrorist threat, have, as Martin Bright points out, originated from Whitehall ‘sources’. This means that, due to the relationship between media and these ‘sources’ being entirely unofficial, the same type of detailed explanations of the structural process, which are described for the central government system, are unavailable. However, as Martin Bright points out, there is a structure present, albeit unofficial. Furthermore, this structure is about to be further developed through the reform of the Official Secrets Act (1989), in response to its recent shortcomings .
The fact that each of the security services now has an unofficial press officer who is put in touch with a representative from each of the national newspapers, suggests that the intelligence services, as an arm of the government , recognise the power of intelligence ‘leaks’ as political tools.
The next part of the interview focussed on the societal implications of the legislative reaction to terrorism. The government’s legislative response is often typified as a ‘huge attack on human rights’, as opposed to the concern that it constitutes an ‘imminent threat that needs addressing’. Both propositions are highly problematic. Bright spoke of the risk that will see "crackdowns on human rights in this country as addressing the problem of terrorism…that ratcheting up the idea that we’re under an unprecedented threat…there’s some kind of paradigm shift in the world of terror that needs to be addressed". He continues; "…it strikes me that the two things are not necessarily connected, that one will not necessarily have an impact on the other, quite the contrary…that it may actually have a negative effect" and "…if you start to lock up people without trial in high security prisons…the sense of injustice within Muslim communities would fuel radicalism’. Bright added that he feels that the people that really need to be asked about the best way to respond are the police, and they know that extra legislation isn’t going to help.
As far as the government’s response to the threat was concerned, Bright felt that we must understand the position in which the government finds itself. He points out that the government has no need to inflate the threat faced, as it is clear and present (reflected by the events in Madrid). He posed the question; should government receive intelligence and not act because of human rights? Or alternatively should they say; the risk is too great "just get these people off the streets where at least they won’t be capable of perpetrating any acts of terrorism". He drew attention to the fact that other governments have seen the fallout (USA and Spain), and here in the UK, David Blunkett clearly feels that if there was a similar attack, as Home Secretary, he would be held personally responsible. Furthermore, it is this level of personal responsibility that has resulted in the government’s heavy-handed response. He goes on to say that it is this response to the threat, which could ultimately serve to encourage radicalism, which does need addressing,
Bright then explained that he does not believe there is any kind of "conscious effort to build up the atmosphere of terror in order to persuade people to think that anti terror legislation is needed". He believes there is no need to exaggerate as there are Islamist atrocities occurring which are coming closer and closer to the UK, and that the government are genuinely worried by what’s happening. He suggests that an inherent "danger" exists if we support the notion of conspiracy, and that these acts are in some way "convenient" for government. With regards to the government’s ability to address the threat, Bright felt that we should question Tony Blair and David Blunkett’s judgment, as it had so far been very poor in dealing with terrorism. He felt that the real issue that needs addressing is the capability and quality of our intelligence services and investigators of crime. From his own experience, he explained that they are not particularly good, and before September 11th 2001 they were even worse. He points out that they never knew who their Islamist sources were up until very late, and they don’t know who is dangerous and who is a genuine campaigner for justice in their own country. His feelings concerning the ATCSA detainees is that people had been rounded up who have nothing to do with terrorism, and that if the government have made mistakes in the past they need to ‘reassure us that the people they want to apply this new legislation to are going to be the right people’.
In ‘Manufacturing Consent’ terms, the government’s use of Whitehall ‘sources’ certainly appears to qualify as at least one of the five filters of Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model, through which news must pass before its general release. "Sourcing Mass Media News: the Third Filter" (p18), describes how powerful sources "take advantage of media routines and manipulate them into following a special agenda" and how "part of this management process involves inundating the media with stories, which serve to sometimes to foist a particular line". Interestingly, in the US, this approach can be traced back to WW1, when it was "discovered…that one of the best ways of controlling news was flooding news channels with ‘facts’, or what amounted to official information" (p.23).
However, as the interview shows, Bright rejects what he sees as the "Chomsky line" when dealing with the terrorist threat, which he feels almost suggests that there is a ‘conspiracy’ that terrorist acts are convenient for government. It is important to point out here that the ‘propaganda model’ presented in ‘Manufacturing Consent’ does not suggest that there is a conspiracy, rather, that the function of the mass media can be better understood through realisation of the filtering process that news passes through before its final presentation. In light of this, the elite ‘consensus’ which influences each of the 5 filters are far more obvious than any conspiracy. Furthermore, as concerns the new terrorism legislation, this rejection fails to address the obvious disparity between the speed of application of the new law, and the ongoing controversy that surrounds it.
The discussion specifically addressed the issue of media control, which Bright thought was still highly relevant. As an experienced journalist, Bright spoke of the effects of the cuts made to foreign desk budgets and investigative units in favour of press releases and official sources, and the further effect that this is having on the knowledge of foreign cultures that newsrooms have. Overall, Bright saw these factors as having serious implications on the quality of journalism. He pointed out that the Observer doesn’t have any foreign correspondents, and in the journalism industry their presence is fast diminishing. The principal concern raised from this is how the investigative powers of journalists and newspapers have been undermined by their increasing reliance on press releases, foreign correspondents, and official sources, which stifles their investigative ability.
The final point raised was on the reform of the Official Secrets Act. Bright pointed out that he has always felt that the "strange" relationship between the intelligence services and the media needs reforming, so he welcomes the fact that they are now planning to do so. He feels that there needs to be a front desk and a press office, in order for the relationship to be successfully challenged.
Conclusion
In light of the paper it would seem that the presentation of the terrorist threat, and the rationale behind the legislative responses that attempt to address it, are both highly problematic and contentious. However, this can be better understood in light of the theoretical framework that incorporates an understanding of media/intelligence interaction , ‘risk society’ , the ‘propaganda model’ , and ‘hyperreality’ .
The disparity between the ease of application of new terror laws, and its opposition which claims that it overreaches its targets at the expense of fundamental rights, could be interpreted in a variety of different ways, none of which are mutually exclusive, which ultimately reveal the complexity of the situation.
As the Martin Bright interview demonstrates; there is a danger in any simplistic assumption that proclaims ‘emergency legislation is conspiratorial’, or that ‘risk society creates terrorism’. A closer analysis of the assessment reveals a tangled web of interconnection that discards conspiracy, and invalidates the response that fails to evaluate the situation holistically, and from a variety of perspectives.
Terrorism is undoubtedly a principal manufacturer of risk in our time. The response to the recent terrorist attacks has been informed by the politics of risk aversion. This, in turn, has accelerated the use of risk management strategies, reflected in the drive towards ID cards, rapidly advancing forms of surveillance, and the continued ‘rounding up’ of high ‘risk’ groups.
The process by which the public, politicians, and media react to terrorism, can have the adverse effect of amplifying risk and deviancy . In his essay Creating the Enemy , Brendan O’Neill (2004) points out how this circularity can be seen whereby risk-averse societies promote, advertise, and even create their greatest vulnerability, which is the very ‘risk’ they aim to address . This highlights how recent large scale atrocities have demonstrated the ability of terrorism to understand "what is likely to have the biggest impact on fearful western societies". He continues:
"The fallout from Madrid powerfully demonstrates that terrorism’s impact is determined less by what the terrorists do, than by how governments and the public respond to it. How we experience terrorism depends on how we feel about ourselves, our way of life, our society and our values."
This paper has argued that the triangular relationship between government, media, and people, creates a force field in which governments can pass laws in the ‘heat of the moment’. The current threat of international ‘cross-border’ terrorism adds to the tension of these relationships, and provides a fertile environment for actuarial policy and its attempts to harness ‘risk’.
Recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated the need for governments to adapt their policies in recognition of the new threats faced. However, ignoring the long-term implications of legislation has lead to a failure to protect the very laws and freedoms that they aim to protect, which perhaps remains the best implement for addressing terrorism and ensuring that justice prevails. In this sense the dilemma remains. The terrorist threat seems to degrade the rule of law not just in the physical destruction that they cause, but also in undermining the legal system that underpins democratic societies.
