A review of security came after the Brighton bombing in 1984 of the Grand Hotel where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Conservative Government ministers were staying for the partyโs autumn conference, as a file at the National Archives shows.
Her Majestyโs Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Lawrence Byford led the review. The file opens with his letter to the main political parties of October 22, 1986, stating that โno chief constable can guarantee absolute security for a party conference which of necessity will be attended by a large number of people and held in premises to which the general public have had pen accessโ. As a party conference was essentially a private occasion, the ultimate decision rested with the parties, he added. That said, the police force for the location of the conference โ such as Dorset for Bournemouth, and Sussex for Brighton โ took charge of protecting the event; and (to leave the file for a moment) such forces were not the largest, city ones. Hence a scheme of public events for police to search hotels for explosives beforehand, using hired private security staff to search on entry; and the technical equipment.
Sir Lawrence wrote that generally the higher levels of security introduced since the 1984 bombing had come in โwithout significant resistanceโ from the party members. โIt is possible however that as the Brighton bomb fades further into the distance people will become less willing to submit themselves to the constraint of tighter security.โ After Brighton, the Metropolitan Police (which long took a lead on countering terrorism) produced a booklet on security of political prmises against terrorist threats.
‘Safe houses’
The file included a cutting from the Daily Express of May 20, 1985 that Mrs Thatcher and her cabinet would stay in โsecret and safe housesโ, rather than the traditional Blackpool seafront hotels for the 1985 autumn conference; and they would be kept on the move. The Express further reported that they would be protected by the latest security and surveillance equipment; and that SAS and armed police would patrol the grounds. A Police Federation conference at Blackpool had provided a rehearsal. An editorial by the newspaper called it regrettable, โbut a necessary price to payโ.
A working group on security at party conferences had met at the Home Office on February 20, 1985, chaired by Sir Lawrence. Among those attending were the Sussex and other chief constables; a man from the security service; and John Hoddinott, who as deputy chief constable of Hampshire had the task of drawing up a report on the Brighton conferenceโs security. The group was due to work on search procedures; accommodation for VIPs; vetting; and access control and pass systems. Hoddinott went on to give a presentation to police chiefs at a meeting at Lancashire Police headquarters, on March 8, 1985. The British Army, the RUC (since renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland) and the Met Police would give a one-day course on search procedures to one or two police officers from each force, that we might call for โtrain the trainersโ purposes. As for where VIPs would stay during a conference, while โsafe housesโ were indeed mentioned as the Express later reported, police did not want ministers to be โdispersedโ around a town.
Police stated who was responsible for what. Hotels would be responsible for their own security, although the police would have โoversightโ. Questions police wanted the Home Office to answer included who would pay for the kit; and did securing of conferences included those by the Young Conservatives; the TUC; and the CBI? Police raised questions also about who should be vetted, and when. What pass system would an event use, and which technical devices such as x-ray machines? Another point was around the stating of threat levels; and the legal constraints around any operation, such as closing of roads, because police might not have any basis in law to do so, and might only rely on the goodwill of the public.
The autumn 1985 conference season would see Labour at Bournemouth; the Social Democrats (SDP) at Torquay, the Scottish nationalists at Paisley, the TUC at Blackpool and CBI at Harrogate.
The file includes a summary of the Hoddinott report. Major parts were deemed unsuitable for publication on security grounds. The Sussex Police planning for Brighton had begun in April 1984. Hoddinott wrote of a โlong standing practice of the police that protection and security precautions must be in keeping with the nature of the occasion to be protected and not vice versaโ. As for a party conference, party personnel and delegates had to meet freely. A hotel was the scene for โsocial functionsโ, whereas the conference centre was for the Conservative party only. As for a threat assessment. Hoddinott noted no specific threat suggested beforehand for Brighton. Hoddinott recommended a standard definition of threat levels, denoted by numbers (although the threat level to the UK from terror, run by MI5, is in terms of words โ moderate, substantial, severe and so on).
Search
A detailed and protracted search of the Grand Hotel, in Hoddinottโs findings, โwould have been neither feasible nor acceptable. Sussex Police could not have done a โsearch and seal operationโ. The hotel during the conference didnโt check at entry, or search people coming in. The ground floor public rooms of the hotel were available to the public during the conference; although the road outside had barriers, they were mainly to keep demonstrators away.
Operational order
Hoddinott turned to the operational order, which did not contain instructions for a search of the entire hotel before the conference; and no such search was carried out; โโฆ. with techniques then in use it is by no means certain that the best practicable search would have found a bomb concealed on the sixth floor in advance of the conferenceโ. Hoddinott was critical of the first floor search โ the floor where Mrs Thatcher and senior ministers had rooms. The operational order didnโt specify a search there. Police and an explosives โsnifferโ dog search the Prime Ministerโs suite, before her arrival, but one of the other two suites was not searched; although, given that the bomb went off on the sixth floor, that less than full search did not affect what happened: five dead, including a member of Parliament, and 30 injured, including the minister Norman Tebbit whose wife was left paralysed.
