Where are the malicious uses of drones? asks Mark Rowe.
It may be peculiar to ask why something is not occurring – drones used by terrorists, or merely the mischievous – when private security people have enough threats to contend with. Yet for several years security people have worried about drones, in various settings. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have shown how drones have become a weapon of war – that not only deliver bombs, but at a fraction at the cost of other, crewed, aircraft. ‘No drone’ perimeter signage is common at nuclear power stations, RAF and other airfields, and the Millennium Dome at Greenwich (pictured). Why the (relative) lack of attack?
Mike Croll, the author of The Rise of Security and an articulate presenter of some 2000 years of history of private security, and with equally penetrating predictions for the future, is among the speakers at the ASIS UK all-day summer seminar at Twickenham Stadium on Wednesday, June 19. He points to the assassination attempt in 2018 by drone of the president of Venezula, Nicolas Maduro, in the country’s capital, Caracas. Football matches (such as a Brentford-Wolves, Saturday afternoon kick-off in the dark in January 2022) have been halted by an overflying drone, if only because the risk to the Premier League is financial not security – it doesn’t want a drone taking video of play, to clash with its commercial broadcasting deals.
In prisons, drones can deliver drugs and other contraband. On super-yachts, a security risk survey has to include drones, for photo-journalists may send up drones at harbours seeking images of the rich and famous, to sell; and the yacht users want their privacy protected. You can likewise come across cases of drones used in cities for ‘peeping Tom’ purposes – who’s to say that a drone could not fly as a (fairly) stable platform outside a window on a high floor of an office building, to carry out industrial espionage – to gather passwords from the keystrokes at desks?
To return to Mike Croll a moment, in presentations he points out the mass-market Ring drone (yet to reach the UK market), that can sit in your home and (in the night, so you don’t have to) go on a tour of rooms if alerted by noise. At least one corporate security manager has at least considered the merits of using drones indoors to carry out patrols around rooms, as an alternative to CCTV or a human patroller. Abroad, at hotel resorts, drones are in use to do patrols of large perimeters; likewise drones lend themselves to large factory spaces to do surveillance for safety more than security purposes, to give notice of potential incidents (such as forklift truck collisions).
That drones are not yet in use for ‘last mile’ delivery in built-up areas, let alone as taxis, would suggest that despite the potentially profitable mass markets, in practical terms those uses can’t and won’t go ahead. The mystery, though, is why more malicious people haven’t latched onto drones. Such scenarios as: over a crowded place, to drop acid or other chemical weapon. Or not even something that can cause harm, but vinegar or talcum powder – the malice being that those underneath would only know something liquid or powdery is falling over them, which could trigger a dangerous stampede, or at least enough confusion to cause an event (a concert or sporting event, or a ‘fan zone’ watching either) to stop or be evacuated. If the definition of terrorism is to cause fear, such an attack would count as a terrorist success. Recall the Gatwick Airport incident of December 2018, when reported sightings of drones caused the airport to be closed, causing colossal disruption to flights before Christmas. Whether the drones were carrying a dangerous payload, or even whether they were there at all, was immaterial; the inability of police and the authorities to prove the airspace was safe, became the problem. By contrast, large sports and other events may well get rung-in hoax threats of a bomb; the venues can go ahead and discount the threats, because of thorough searches of premises beforehand.
Drones, then, to the malicious, have attractions. You can be anonymous, sitting in a car, controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The reasons we haven’t seen more malicious use of drones may be practical, even banal.
Yes, the ‘barrier to entry’ of gathering the ingredients – a drone and some payload – are far lower than making, storing and transporting of a CBRN (chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear) device, which may well require the resources of a nation. Even so, whether you buy the materials online or in person, you have to buy little and often, or otherwise try to avoid official notice of suspicious purchases. Even if a drone costs in the low hundreds of pounds, you – to stereotype, a young, alienated male – still have to find that money.
The 9-11 terrorists notoriously learned how to fly in the United States. The malicious drone user will want to learn how to fly the UAV. If the user is too young or poor to know how to drive a car yet, a UAV is even more complicated, in three dimensions. Many are the drone or model users who have taken to the skies and lost their machine!? To pilot a drone for some distance – to make it worthwhile to use one, rather than carry out your malicious act in person – takes some proficiency. Where are you going to practice? In the 1939-45 war, the Royal Air Force could practice dropping its ‘bouncing bomb’ off the north Kent coast, or on Ladybower Dam in the Peak District, without Nazi Germany seeing. In built-up areas, you’re under more natural surveillance than you might think, even if only from dog walkers. The malicious drone user may then, if in London, seek somewhere quiet – Epping Forest; if in Manchester or Sheffield, the Peak District National Park? Even if you find a deserted area, chances are it’ll be raining, or foggy, making flying difficult. Even there, someone may see you, and in such a remote place the pilot will seem yet more suspect. Even if you master flying a drone undisturbed, flying on moorland is not the same as in a city and may require further training.
All this may explain why the terrorists of terror attacks in the UK in 2017, and since, used vehicles as weapons, and readily-available knives: Westminster Bridge, Borough Market, and Finsbury Park mosque. Yes, Manchester Arena was a bomb; while the Parsons Green device was only a ‘partial explosion’ (to quote a Parliamentary committee), and while no-one was killed, more were hurt in the crush to leave the scene than due to the device. Further evidence that for the malicious (rather than outright terrorist), a weapon need not be capable of injury, to lead to harm.
