Author: Dan Kaszeta
ISBN No: 9781119743040
Review date: 09/05/2024
No of pages: 400
Publisher: Wiley
Publisher URL:
https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/CBRN+and+Hazmat+Incidents+at+Major+Public+Events%3A+Planning+and+Response%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9781119743040
Year of publication: 11/01/2023
Brief:
CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response
price
£95, hardback; also ebook
I was ready to be daunted, and depressed, by this second, updated edition of Dan Kaszeta’s book, but I need not have been, writes Mark Rowe.
For one thing, the author does not give us (his phrase) a ‘catalogue of death and destruction’. For another, Dan doesn’t get technical – no need to, he says, wisely advising that the venue safety and security manager focuses their limited time on the outcome. We may think of people clutching at their necks and writhing horribly; instead, Dan tells us not to believe Hollywood. In a word, latency; a chemical-biological-radiological or nuclear attack (whether malicious or a leak of an industrial toxin as after the Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, India) may take some time to show itself, and victims may be unwell rather than dead (and requiring a mortuary?).
Dan writes: “In the context of emergency planning and emergency response, ill and injured people provide a far greater burden than dead victims. While dead people must be taken care of, the urgency is far less than with living victims who need rescue, decontamination, immediate first aid, and/or transport to definitive medical care.”
Property may be contaminated and rendered unusable for its intended purpose. Sometimes actual contamination is not necessary for people to imagine that contamination might be present, he writes. In other words, besides the actual medical harm, venue managers have to bargain for the social, economic and psychological aspects. Think, as an aside, how long it took the cathedral city of Salisbury (pictured) to recover, after the novichok poisoning of the Skripals by Russian agents; and how police and other first responders were in danger, and innocent people, besides the intended targets.
A CBRN incident, then, may be against a venue – a stadium or convention centre for example – but it’s also for local healthcare to consider. Also various functions in the venue, not just stewarding; crisis comms for instance. Nor need it take an actual CBRN incident to do harm – someone could maliciously set off tear gas, (and publicise it on social media?) seeking to start a panic.
This book, then, even if you don’t want to face up to a CBRN threat, a worthwhile read because of how it can usefully inform your practices. To take a hoax (whether in real life or spread on social media) or simply a bad smell – how does your venue’s staff go about reporting that? And promptly (Dan offers a chapter on the ‘first hour’). Because as Dan says towards the end in a chapter on crisis comms, ‘conspiracy theories and disinformation will multiply in a CBRN environment’.
I’d point you towards the word ‘incident’ in the title – as Dan points out, a spill could be due to a man-made error (‘incompetence has killed more people than terrorism’) or a flood could ’cause a serious release of dangerous materials’. Dan shows how the sheer gamut of life can include something as extreme as a CBRN incident, whether a malicious hoax (perhaps an improvised explosive device, fake or real?) or a false alarm. One of the case studies Dan relates is from America from December 2014, a strong smell of chlorine permeated the Hyatt hotel in Rosemont, Illinois, not far from Chicago O’Hare Airport.
The hotel was hosting the Midwest FurFest convention — a meeting of the “furry” community. “Furries” are enthusiasts who dress in non-human costumes. Due to a strong odour of chlorine, the building was evacuated (‘and thousands of furries were, ironically, given refuge in a neighbouring dog show’). As Dan concludes, a small amount of material can have a disproportionate effect (at Midwest FurFest, the evacuation of thousands of people). Someone malicious – and who or what was behind this case remains a mystery – doesn’t have to seriously hurt someone to cause major, temporary, disruption. Not a laughing matter after all.
Contents
Introduction to the Second Edition xxiii
Part I: The Operational Environment
Chapter 1: The CBRN and Hazardous Materials Threat 3
Adverse Effects 3
Categories of Threat Materials 7
Means of Dissemination 11
The Cause of the Problem: The Perpetrator 14
Nuisances, Hoaxes, and Communicated Threats 15
References 17
Chapter 2: The Major Events Operating Environment 19
Aspects of Events 19
Attendees—The Commonplace “Cast of Characters” 20
Public Transportation and Transport Infrastructure 23
Effects of Weather, Particularly in Urban Environments 24
Major Events Serve as a Multiplier for Terrorist Attacks 25
The Organizational and Bureaucratic Environment 26
References 30
Chapter 3: Social, Behavioral, and Psychological Issues 31
CBRN Materials, Fear, and Anxiety 32
Assessing Group Behavior 33
What Behavior do you Expect or Want? 35
How do we Apply this Knowledge? 36
References 39
Part II: Planning
Chapter 4: Interagency Planning and Cooperation 43
Differences in Operational Perspectives 44
Fixing the Problems of Poor Cooperation 47
Incident Management Systems 48
Some Critiques of Incident Management Schemes 51
The Operations Center 52
AD Hoc Operations Centers 54
Best Practices –How to Make Operations Centers Work 54
References 57
Chapter 5: General Planning Considerations: Building Capability and Capacity 59
Establish Your Planning Threshold 59
Resilience 61
Examining and Building Capability and Capacity 62
The Synchronization Matrix as a Planning Tool 64
Addressing the Red Ink: Operational Deficits 66
Developing an Assessment Scheme 68
Best Practices for an Assessment Team 70
Lesson Learned: Do not get Too Hung up on Worst-Case Scenarios 73
References 74
Chapter 6: Buildings and Venues 75
Major Types of Venue 75
Reconnaissance: Site Surveys and Walkthroughs 80
Physical Characteristics: Air Flow and Ventilation 83
Hazardous Materials at or Near Venues 87
References 88
Chapter 7: Procurement: Buying Goods and Services 91
Interacting with Vendors in an Intelligent Way 92
Detection and Identification Hardware 94
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 96
Decontamination 97
References 99
Chapter 8: Preparedness in the Medical Sector 101
References 101
Sizing up the Problem 102
Preparedness at the Field Level: The Concept of “Special Events Medical Services” 105
Preparedness at the Hospital Level: Getting Ready for Mass
Casualty Incidents (MCI) in the CBRN/HAZMAT Arena 106
Preparedness at the Public Health Level: Biomedical Surveillance 108
Dealing with the “Worried Well” 109
Lesson Learned: Intensive Care Can be the Critical Shortfall 111
References 112
Chapter 9: Preparedness in the Law Enforcement, Security, and Intelligence Sectors 115
Understanding the Process of CBRN Terrorism 116
Anti-Terrorism: Preventing or Deterring an Attack 118
Preparing Police to Operate in CBRN Environments 121
Lesson Learned: Countersurveillance—Pretend
Like you are the Bad Guys 124
Lesson Learned: Use the 1-2- 3 Rule 124
References 125
Chapter 10: Preparedness in the Firefighting, Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Disciplines 127
Adapting the Fire Service Response to CBRN/HAZMAT Incidents at Major Events 127
Responder Safety 129
Planning for Decontamination 129
Rescue in the Hot Zone: Who and How? 130
CBRN/HAZMAT Mitigation 133
Lesson Learned: Follow the Hart Team 135
References 136
Chapter 11: Preparedness and Response in the Private Sector and “Third Sector” 137
Private Versus Public Spaces 137
Private Security Personnel 138
Facility Management Staff 141
Charities, Volunteers, and “Unaffiliated Responders” 142
PPE for the Private Sector and Third Sector Responders 144
References 145
Chapter 12: The Military—Preparing for Military Support to the Civil Authorities 147
Understanding Military CBRN Philosophy 147
Relationship Between Military and Civil Authorities 149
Issues and Problems with Military Support 152
Some Ideas to Help Integrate Military Support 154
Lesson Learned: Civil Support Teams 155
Reference 155
Chapter 13 Other Preparedness Issues 157
Transportation and Logistics 157
Communications Technology 158
Financial and Administrative Preparedness 159
Legal Considerations 160
Language Support 162
Laboratory and Scientific Preparedness 162
Reach-Back 166
Lessons Learned: There’s Almost Always an International Context 168
References 168
Part III: Response
Chapter 14: The First Hour 173
What to do in the First Hour 173
Assessment of Incidents 175
Essential Elements of Information (EEI) 175
Sizing up The Incident 177
What Not to do in the First Hour 182
Withdrawal as a Tactic 183
Lessons Learned from History 183
References 184
Chapter 15: Characterizing the Threat 185
Detection, Identification, Measurement, and Identification Equipment and its Use 185
Specifications of Sensors 191
Putting it Together: Writing Sensors into Operational Plans 192
Thinking out of the Box—Detection Using Non-Specialty Sensor Technology 194
Hazard Prediction Models 196
Lesson Learned: Leveraging Existing Detection Capabilities 196
References 197
Chapter 16: Medical Response 199
Dividing the Problem into Syndromes 199
Managing The Incident—Being Realistic in Chemical Scenarios 201
Field Care—Remember the ABCDD 203
Practical Incident Management Measures 204
Definitive Care 206
Lesson Learned: Treat the Patient not the Scenario 208
Mini-Chapter: Lessons from a Pandemic 209
References 212
Chapter 17: Decontamination 215
Why do Decontamination? 215
Decon at Major Events 217
Categories of Decontamination 218
Methods of Decontamination 220
Tactical Considerations 221
Lesson Learned: Large Volume Decontamination is Possible 227
References 227
Chapter 18: Public Affairs and Crisis Communication 229
The Audience: Who are we Talking to? 230
Principles of Communicating in a Crisis 231
Joint Information Centers 233
What Not to do 233
The Phenomenon of Bad Information 234
Lesson Learned: Conspiracy Theories and Disinformation will Multiply in a CBRN Environment 237
References 237
Chapter 19: Consequence Management and Other Response Measures 239
General Frameworks and References for Consequence Management 239
Lesson Learned: Victims from Other Countries 248
References 248
Chapter 20: Forensics and Investigations 251
CBRN Forensics as a Specialty 251
Collection and Preservation of Evidence: General Considerations 253
Integrity of the Evidence 255
Possible Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 257
Lessons Learned 260
References 261
Part IV: Practical Scenarios
Introduction to the Practical Scenarios 265
Scenario A Searching Arenas and Stadiums 267
Scenario B Screening People, Goods, and Vehicles 275
Scenario C Threats and Hoaxes 281
Scenario D Unattended Items and Vehicles 287
Scenario E Suspicious Powders and Crime Scene Issues 291
Scenario F Industrial Chemical Accidents 295
Scenario G Mystery Smells and Illnesses 299
Scenario H Chemical Warfare Agent Terrorism on Public Transport 305
Scenario I Large-scale Chemical Terrorism 311
Scenario J Attacks with Biological Warfare Agents 317
Scenario K Pandemic Illness 321
Scenario L Radiological Attacks 327
Scenario M Major Nuclear Power Plant Incident 333
Appendices
Appendix A Example Threat Basis and Planning Threshold 339
Appendix B Template for a CBRN/HAZMAT Site Survey 343
Appendix C Example Task Lists, Capability Survey, and Capacity Survey 347
Appendix D Synchronization Matrix—Simplified
