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Here we round off a three-part article on a Home Office working party on ‘internal security’ which by seeking to gather evidence on crime against retail offers an insider’s view of what crime against business looked like, 50 years ago.
A long, undated and anonymous typed paper came to the working party from a central London address, in January 1973. It stressed โthat the main solution to minimising losses of stock and money lies with management and unless it is appreciated by senior management that it is their responsibility, little of the work carried out by outside agencies will have much effectโ. In other words, the writer felt it was unfair of a business to complain of poor police and guard support.
Average losses were only one per cent of turnover; and a โsmall reduction in loss can soon pay for expense of securityโ. First, the paper advised, a firm should state the movement of goods and money; โwhat retailing is all aboutโ. In other words, to prevent loss a retailer had to understand itself. Security equipment, if kept up to date, could deter and trap criminals, but some firms could make exaggerated claims; โagain, the equipment is only as good as those responsible for operating itโ.
A contract of employment, the paper went on, should include the right to search staff. A shop should have some way to identify its staff, if only a badge. And it was worthwhile considering putting some security staff into uniform, or give them shoulder flashes; โthis has been found to help both as a deterrent and in the reduction of hooliganismโ.
Prosecution, the paper described as โthe ultimate deterrentโ. Smaller retailers it suggested were reluctant to take cases to court, in case it went wrong; โโฆ. But all too often the punishment does not appear to fit the crime, especially in cases of a previous conviction for shoplifting.โ
The report said: โThere is no doubt in the local press in the provinces, the report of a case is considered by those found guilty as far more serious than any fine โฆ.โ
Among the reportโs wise remarks, it said that a security department to prevent losses was to enhance the business, and company reputation. No staff call was too trivial. It was desirable to talk to staff about security in their training.
If a customer informed sales staff of another customer who is stealing something, โthank the customer for their interest, but be over-cautiousโ, the paper advised, because customers were not trained observers. Taking a customerโs tip could lead to โwrong actionsโ.
Places of particular risk included fitting rooms (โcan be a constant source of lossโ) and handbags and purses (thefts by โdippersโ). As for internal security, the paper said: โThere is usually some small indication that all is not well. It may be the finding of an empty hangar in an unusual place, garments missing from new stock which has been recently counted, over-spending by a staff member etcโ. An investigation would have a โgood influenceโ on other staff, it was suggested.
The paper said detectives โshould not make the mistake of concentrating on customers only whilst patrolling the sales floorโ. Store detectives should look for collusion between staff and customers; such as a member of staff booking two garments when only one was paid for (clearing staff to take away a second item). Company rules allowed door checks when staff were leaving the building; at any time; โit must be done pleasantly but firmlyโ.
So much of what the Home Office was told by retail in 1973 remains as sound today.
Source; file HO 287/1899, National Archives, Kew, west London.
