The Sahel in Africa is the new epicentre of global terrorism, writes Gary Abbott, risk analyst at the London-based consultancy Northcott Global Solutions.
Inhospitable, conflict-ridden, and politically volatile, the Sahel is a vast semi-arid region of Africa extending from Senegal eastward to Sudan. It is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the world, attracting lower levels of investment than other developing economies. However, the region’s economic potential and geostrategic importance should not be overlooked. The Sahel is one of the richest regions in the world in terms of natural resources, including oil, gold, and uranium. Instability in the Sahel has also been one of the main drivers of the migration crisis, with hundreds and thousands of migrants escaping conflict at home for a better life in Europe. In the last decade, the region has become a backdrop of great power competition between the West, Russia, and China – all seeking spheres of influence in Africa.
Predominantly francophone, countries in the Sahel have strong relations with France and other European Union (EU) states. In 2014, France launched Operation Barkhane to rid the region of Islamist terrorism, but the operation’s failure and the French withdrawal in November last year inadvertently created a governance and security vacuum. This vacuum has since been exploited by a host of undesirable actors including Russian mercenaries, non-state armed groups, and terrorists.
Terrorist activity in the region has increased by over 2,000 per cent in the last 15 years – so much so that the Sahel is now regarded as the epicentre of global terrorism. The 2022 Global Terrorism Index revealed that the Sahel accounted for a larger share of the world’s terrorism-related deaths than South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions combined. According to the UN, terrorist groups frequently target remote border areas, notably Liptako-Gourma (the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) and the Lake Chad Basin (the tri-border area of Niger, Chad, and Nigeria). The recent expansion in what the UN describes as violent extremism (VE) across the Sahel is driven by interrelated factors which centre on the inability of states to meet the basic needs of citizens, resulting in widespread disenfranchisement. Ungoverned spaces, zones that lay beyond the reach of governments, are breeding grounds for many VE groups and enable the proliferation of drug, fuel and people trafficking as well as other illicit activities region-wide.
There are four main VE groups (which in practice operate more as franchises and loosely connected organisations with their own leaders and local interests) that have capitalised on these underlying grievances: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM; an al-Qaeda affiliate, primarily active in the Liptako-Gourma region between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger), Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel; primarily active in Liptako-Gourma), Boko Haram (most active in the Lake Chad Basin), and IS West Africa Province (ISWAP; an offshoot of Boko Haram, concentrated in the Lake Chad Basin). Despite differences in tactics and strategies (JNIM is known to be open to dialogue with state and sub-state actors while infrequently targeting local civilian nationals; while the latter three groups tend to conduct indiscriminate killings against local and foreign nationals alike), all four groups are likely to target foreign nationals and the operations and assets of foreign companies. This can range from targeting fixed assets with IEDs or conducting targeted killings and kidnaps of foreign employees. Further, all such groups use violence as a means to expand their influence across West Africa and to expel Western influence, be it physical assets (military or civilian) or ideas (such as secularism and liberalism).
The rise in VE groups has dramatically increased the threat to hard assets and employees of multinational companies in the region, particularly in extraction industries such as mining. Five of Burkina Faso’s 17 industrial gold mines were closed between 2021 and 2022 due to the security threat posed by VE groups. Supply chains are frequently compromised, with VE groups trafficking fuel, motorbikes, food, and even medical products. Operations in formerly safe areas now require close protection officers, armoured vehicles, and 24/7 guarding. There is a greater emphasis on operational security (such as secure communication channels and route variation when travelling), and mobile escorts are frequently required. IEDs present a greater threat and have a larger operational reach across the region – in practice, this means that travelling at night is ill-advised and route planning is critical. Vetting procedures for locally engaged staff have become increasingly important as has quick reaction force capability from nearby locations. There is also a greater demand for intelligence on VE groups, their locations, modus operandi, and targets (a top-line assessment has been provided in Figure 1). Porous borders mean that companies operating in neighbouring West African states, such as Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, Benin, and Ghana, are likely to be increasingly exposed to attacks from VE groups.
Looking to the future, we have developed three scenarios (See Forecast Table: above) on how the threat posed by VE groups may develop in the coming years. In the absence of sustained state-building and a region-wide counter-VE strategy, the ‘Ascendent VE Groups’ scenario is likely to become a reality. Such a scenario is likely to lead to a spread of operational threats to formerly low-medium threat locations, driving up the demands for expertise and operational assistance. Two recent developments have increased the likelihood of the worst-case scenario. First, in June 2023 Mali’s military government demanded the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) to withdraw, which risks undermining a 2015 peace agreement between the government and the Tuareg separatists. Second, the aborted mutiny in late June by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin raises questions over the continued deployment of Russian mercenaries across the Sahel, who have so far secured some tactical successes against VE groups and have largely plugged the security vacuum that emerged after Operation Barkhane.
For companies to successfully operate in this complex and challenging environment, engagement with local expertise is essential to understand the motives and operational footprint of VE groups. Technology must be deployed to provide timely incident alerts in relation to fixed entities and tracked personnel. Measures that were once more common to the more high-profile countries in the Middle East have now become an essential requirement for operations across the Sahel.
About NGS
With over a decade of experience in the region, Northcott Global Solutions (NGS) combines in-country assets with political risk expertise to offer a holistic support service; should assistance be required, our 24-hour operations centre allows a rapid response to emergencies. We identify vulnerabilities and threats to mitigate risk exposure, enabling businesses to operate in the Sahel and other highly demanding environments.
