Current and emerging threats to ports, harbours, offshore installations and shipping from underwater attack can only be deterred and defeated through constant vigilance and the intelligent use of advanced technologies, advises Rear Admiral Chris Parry.
Our globalised world and its economic prosperity and growth are critically dependent on the use of the oceans, with 96 percent of global trade by volume carried by sea. The sea is, in effect, the physical equivalent of the world-wide web and the freedom to use the seas in peace and security remains a vital priority for states and companies. As a result, terrorist and criminal elements have recognised that they can achieve enormous impact, profile and leverage if they can threaten or disrupt international sea-lanes and major maritime hubs. <br><br>Recent attacks on ships in harbour and in maritime straits in areas of poor governance – most notably those on the USS COLE and the MV LIMBOURG – have shown the scale of threat from terrorists. As well as this, operations by the Tamil Sea Tigers and the notorious attack on Mumbai by Islamic terrorists have demonstrated there is considerable potential for an increase in operations launched from the sea against coastal cities and wider maritime targets. <br><br>Similarly, the extended reach of Somali pirates over 1,000 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean through the use of fishing vessels employed as ‘mother ships’, shows the potential scope and scale for further criminal activity at sea. Terrorists and criminals will, of course, have seen the disruption and impact caused – and publicity generated – by the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. <br><br>As a result of the greatly increased awareness, especially in the United States, with its many harbours and ports, all US states whose boundaries include maritime harbours and ports are taking decisive steps to put in place surveillance and security measures to deter, detect and defeat the threats associated with criminal and terrorist activity at sea. It is, incidentally, useful to draw a distinction between a ‘harbour’ and a ‘port’. A harbour is a large natural feature that is suitable for mooring and anchoring ships, while a port is a specific location that has been developed with infrastructure and facilities that support maritime vessels and the storage of materials. As Israel, India and other countries have discovered, it is clear that in the face of growing terrorist and criminal interest, sophisticated, integrated surveillance systems will be required to cope with risks and vulnerabilities in their increasingly complex littoral regions, along with more robust and comprehensive key point and harbour protection schemes. Even so, in future, attacks from the sea by terrorist – and possibly criminals – against urban and vulnerable economic and prestige targets in areas of poor governance and insufficient security look set to continue, together with operations against isolated offshore platforms and installations. <br><br>One aspect currently overlooked – and for which there is significant under-investment in countering – is the potential for covert underwater attack against ports and other coastal targets. The most immediate threat – which has a long history of success – is that of mines or improvised explosive devices that can be laid from a wide variety of commercial and recreational vessels. These devices might come from redundant or surplus military stocks available in a global black market or Underwater Improvised Explosive Devices (UWIEDs) that can be laid on the sea-bed or attached to structures and vessels. As well as the hazards from explosives, the underwater threat posed by smugglers and traffickers seeking lucrative access points is growing. <br><br>It is already, for example, common practice for drugs, illegal materials and arms to be smuggled in externally mounted pods (‘parasites’) below the waterline of ships’ hulls. The examination of hulls before arrival in port or while in harbour is a time-consuming and operationally restricting exercise, often involving excessive and commercially prohibitive delays and the use of divers in near-zero visibility and sometimes dangerous conditions. An emerging issue relates to the threat caused by mini-submarines and semi-submersible vehicles. Mini-submarines and underwater vehicles (usually for covert and Special Forces operations) have proliferated rapidly over the past decade, with notable examples fielded by Iran and North Korea. However, drugs traffickers – operating between South America and the United States – and the Tamil Sea Tigers, have developed and put into use improvised semi-submersible vessels, capable of penetrating conventional coastal and key point surveillance and detection systems. Indeed, these so-called ‘narco-subs’, comprising light-weight, low detection materials and commercially sourced components, have acquired steadily increasing levels of reliability and performance.<br>Further exploitation of the underwater environment by terrorists and criminals is likely. Already, recreational and research mini-sub variants, with operationally useful depth and endurance characteristics, are on the market. The opportunities for covert insertion, attacks on urban targets, energy installations and shipping accessible from the sea and the laying of mines or improvised explosives are evident. <br>Consideration also needs to be given to the possibility that terrorists might attempt to introduce chemical, biological and radiological (or even nuclear) devices through these means. The precautions needed to contain this sort of threat or incident in a busy commercial port (such as Long Beach, California) or naval bases (such as San Diego, California, or Norfolk, Virginia) would be prohibitively disruptive and expensive.<br><br>These risks only increase when one reflects on the vast scale of infrastructure that exists in our crowded and littoral regions – the US alone has more than 95,000 miles of coastline. This region is full of artificial structures, coastal communities, industrial plants, energy installations and renewable projects. <br>Admiral Thad Allen, who was, until May 2010, the Commandant of the US Coast Guard, has written that the challenge of defending coasts is ‘enduring’. He also remarks:<br> <br>We again find ourselves operating in an environment where piracy, illegal migration, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation and environmental crimes are carried out by anonymous, loosely affiliated perpetrators.<br> <br>Indeed, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 delivered comprehensive port security legislation in the US, but this has been only sporadically implemented because of resource and enforcement limitations. This shortfall leaves US ports exposed to both actual attack and hoaxes. In order to sustain economic vitality, ports and offshore installations rely on uninterrupted access and guaranteed security of operation. Needless to say, a successful attack on a major port is likely to lead to operational and commercial disruption on a large scale, possibly leading to losses of millions or billions of dollars. Even a credible threat or hoax would fundamentally dislocate and restrict the operations of a port or other critical shore side infrastructure.<br><br>Deterring – and dealing effectively with and defeating – underwater intruders and mines/UWIEDs depend on an integrated system of surveillance, detection and classification. <br>Effective responses to real or spurious underwater threats require the ability to make informed and rapid decisions based on unambiguous information and visual clarity. In broad terms, it is necessary for authorities to map and understand the features of their underwater seascape and to record the precise features (both natural and man-made) that exist in their area of control. This understanding can only be achieved through routine, regular route and harbour surveys using high-definition, multi-beam sonars, especially in particularly in areas where the seabed is highly textured or cluttered. Only then can anomalies and intrusive devices – such as bottom-laid mines, attachments to structures and UWIEDs – be quickly and accurately detected, ahead of subsequent removal, and the veracity of hoaxes checked. The same technology can be used in surface vehicles or unmanned underwater vehicles to ensure that ships’ hulls are free of underwater ‘parasites’. <br><br>Similarly, protection of critical infrastructure and other installations from underwater approaches by divers and submersible vessels can be achieved through statically mounted arrays of high-definition sonars that can be continuously operated or activated in conditions of high threat. As states and ports introduce more effective, integrated systems for protecting their offshore zones, access and infrastructure, vulnerabilities are likely to evolve in response to improved security techniques and the character of emerging threats. This means technology companies that have the capacity and technological agility to anticipate future trends and continue to provide leading-edge products will be vital to ensuring the integrity of coastal and offshore installations.<br><br>Very few acoustic devices are able to deliver the definitional accuracy, visual clarity and speed of classification required to give assurance in this critical area of maritime security. The level of detail and classification requires a multi-beam system, with sophisticated processing power, that can be easily deployed and deliver instantly recognisable results. The Echoscope UIS (Underwater Inspection System) developed by maritime security enterprise Coda Octopus, can be rapidly deployed in a static location or on vessels ranging in size from 20 feet (6 metres) in length upwards and on unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. The system offers operators ‘best in class’ capability and the ability to detect underwater threats of any kind, including UWIEDS, in the port environment, on ships’ hulls or in the vicinity of other fixed structures.<br><br>For ease of use, the Echoscope UIS does not require special operator skills or training, or prior experience or knowledge of sonar techniques. Also, unlike other types of sonar, the 3D real-time data requires no interpretation or post-processing of the image because the system has been designed with interoperability and integration with existing systems in mind. Data from the Echoscope system can therefore be used for rapid decision-making through display in a wide range of formats that can easily be fused with existing databases and with sophisticated command and control software. It provides unusually distinct images and clarity of vision that enable the detection of devices or intruders by relatively inexperienced personnel with a minimum of training and specialist familiarity in the underwater environment. It is clear that port, coastal and offshore installations represent significant opportunities for attack, disruption and exploitation by terrorists and criminals. As authorities and agencies introduce more sophisticated surface surveillance and intercept capabilities, terrorists and criminals are likely to seek to exploit the underwater environment in their attempts to conduct attacks against prestige targets and expose vulnerabilities – and increase costs and overheads – in both national infrastructures and the international trading system. The provision of high-definition technologies that allow real-time visual clarity, instant classification and rapid risk reduction will be central to deterring and detecting future attacks and in providing continuous assurance to port operators, shipping companies and major investors. <br> <br>About the writer<br> <br>Rear Admiral Christopher J Parry CBE is a former British naval officer who is Chair of the UK Government’s Marine Management Organisation and a leading world authority on maritime issues and security. He is also a senior adviser to Coda Octopus, which is headquartered in New York and has offices in four other locations around the world. He joined the Royal Navy as a Seaman Officer in 1972 and then became an Observer in the Fleet Air Arm in 1979. He was mentioned in despatches during the Falklands War for the rescue of 16 SAS men from Fortuna Glacier, South Georgia, and for his role in detecting and disabling the Argentinian submarine ARA ‘Santa Fe’. He later commanded ‘HMS Gloucester’, the UK’s Maritime Warfare Centre, ‘HMS Fearless’ and the UK’s Amphibious Task Group.
