Among files at the National Archives at Kew is HO 528/7, about security at Ministry of Defence (MoD) sites in the later 1980s, an era of ever greater use of contract guarding, while Irish republican terrorism was remorselessly seeking Army-related targets in England.
The Conservative MP Michael Mates chaired the House of Commons Defence Committee. In April 1990 it finished its report on the โphysical security of military establishments in the UKโ. It had published a similar report in 1984, mainly on the security of nuclear nases and Royal Ordnance (RO) factories, which the then Conservative Government was about to privatise. Since then, Irish republican terrorism on the British mainland had included a bomb at Inglis barracks in north London in August 1988, which killed a soldier; and at the Royal Marine School of Music at Deal in September 1989, which had killed 11 bandsmen.
The committee now concentrated on the โuse of commercial security companiesโ by the Ministry of Defence, and the security of RO factories. The 1980s had also seen protests against Cruise missiles at RAF stations.
The MPs concluded, โwe cannot view with equanimity the apparently growing belief that breach of security at military establishments can be undertaken with impunity for purposes of protest or publicity. Given the state of the terrorism threat such a belief is foolhardy in the extreme.โ
The MPs found โone threat to security comes from the desire to cut costsโ. Use of commercial security by the MoD went back 15 years, and was rising; from ยฃ461,000 in 1984-5, to ยฃ4.418m in 1989-90, so that by 1990 the MoD was employing more than 500 private security guards. Usually their work was at gates 24-hours; at depots, barracks and stores. It compared with some 4600 MoD police (which compared with an establishment of around 5000) and 2100 RAF Police in the UK. As the MPs put it, the experience by the armed forces and MoD of commercial security companies was โmixedโ.
Some guards had proved to be โhopelessโ, physically incapable of lifting a barrier or afraid of the dark. The MPs concluded โit is only too evident that the standards achieved are very considerably below those of military personnelโ. Of the 46 contracts, most were likely to be renewed, the MPs noted, and the service according to the MPs was โat least as good as could be expectedโ. The Deal school, bombed by the IRA, had had private security doing 24-hour gate duty and patrols, before and after the bomb.
The report gave one โappallingโ case of a contract ended prematurely because guards were idle and even smashed windows.
‘Vigilance areasโ
The committee went on to the screening of guards, and spoke of a very serious problem of employment of guards with โcriminal records or propensitiesโ. As for wages, the MoD was paying in the south east of England a commercial company around ยฃ3.50 an hour, which the MoD in giving evidence to the committee admitted was not enough to attract the โblue ribandโ guarding companies to tender. The MPs concluded that MoD contracts were determined on price, โthe results of low ages are high turnover and low quality of personnelโ, who for example fell asleep at work, having gone from one shift to another. The MoD, in the MPsโ words, were โgetting no more and no less than what they are paying forโ. The file has a December 1990 paper by the Home Office suggesting โsecurity vigilance areasโ (SVAs), like neighbourhood watch, only for around defence establishments, such as careers information centres, a particular target for the IRA. As the Home Office admitted, it had emerged that after the Deal barracks bomb, โsome members of the public had had suspicions which might have averted the attack had they been reported to the authorities at the timeโ.
The main terror threat in that era was from Irish republicanism, and the Home Office paper said it didnโt want the impression of an โanti Irish witch huntโ. Still, this idea of SVAs by the Defence Secretary, was welcomed (cautiously) by the Home Secretary. The MoD and police had discussed it for outside the perimeter of sites, where police were responsible, although as the paper pointed out, โsecurity is the concern of allโ. For the publicโs โeyes and earsโ to report suspicious activity, they would have to use the 999 emergency number. Police and the MoD would meanwhile make contingency plans to deal with a terrorist attack.
As the file stated, if terrorists were selecting fire points and mortar base plate positions, it would take time for a stranger to do target reconnaissance and preparations. Publicity material about the scheme noted the case of Conservative MP Ian Gow, killed by a car bomb in July 1990; and a bomb (in a flower bed) in May 1990 that injured civilians at the Institute of Army Education in Eltham, south east London. Also; the shooting of Army recruits at Lichfield. If someone saw anyone taking photographs or keeping watch on foot, in a car, or observing from a building; or any suspicious package or vehicle; they were to ring 999 immediately.
Meanwhile in July 1990 the MoD drafted a reply to the Defence Committee report. It could point to some successful preventions, such as on June 21, 1990 a civilian worker at RAF Stanmore Park found an improvised explosive device (IED) inside the fence; no casualties resulted. A bomb in the hallway of the Carlton Club in central London on June 25, 1990 caused seven injuries. After the Mill Hill bomb in 1988, the Government gave an extra ยฃ88m for MoD site security. The Governmentโs draft reply spoke of a difficult balance, โbetween the demands of security and value for money as the committee have recognisedโ. One example of the ยฃ88m spend was of window film and protective shutters at the Army Education Institute, which had probably prevented more casualties in the May 1990 bomb. Those drafting the reply disagreed among themselves over a line that improvements in security in recent years had โplayed a significant part in forcing PIRA [the Provisionals, the main Irish terrorist group] to attack the kinds of targets which bring their activities into ever deepening contemptโ. A critical note added was that it gave the impression โthat we donโt care if our security measures (deliberately?) force PIRA to attack for example 19-year-old recruitsโ โ as at Lichfield City station. The critic went on, โI suggest the sentence is deletedโ, even though the idea of displacement of such crime evidently had force.
Leaked
The Defence Committee had been due to release their report on May 23, 1990; but it was leaked to the BBC. The Home Office prepared a defence (pardon the pun) about use of commercial security by the MoD and armed services. It repeated a long-held point by the Home Office that it could not make a case โfor introducing statutory control of the private security industryโ. Instead it recommended a โuserโs guideโ to the private security industry; a booklet, which would advise on โthe best of the standards that exist in the private security industryโ, including vetting, training and performance. A Home Office junior minister, John Patten, was due to meet Sir John Wheeler, a Conservative MP whose interest and stake in private security included a dozen years as director-general of the BSIA trade association. The file included a Daily Telegraph cutting quoting from the GMB trade union that Whitehall officials were drawing up a shortlist of โreliableโ private security firms. The Telegraph also reported, a week before proper publication, the leak of the Defence Committee report. Making it all relevant was the murder of a soldier the week before, by a booby-trap, when he drove a van away from the Army careers information centre on Wembley High Road, in north London.
For part two of two, visit https://professionalsecurity.co.uk/blogs/mark-rowe/security-in-history-guarding-of-defence-part-two/.
