The threat of CBRN [chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear] incidents has increased dramatically, writes James Maclaren.
Proliferation has resulted in rogue states and malign non-state actors now having greater access to chemical and radiological capabilities than ever before. State on state war in Europe has threatened the safety of nuclear power plants in Ukraine, while natural disaster continues to render many areas around Fukushima a dangerous radiological hazard. Chemical arsenals in Syria have resulted not only in their use against innocent civilian populations but have been responsible for deadly toxins to falling into the hands of asymmetric terror groups such as Islamic State. The nerve agent VX, developed by the British, weaponised by the United States and included in the CWA stockpiles of several rogue states was used as recently as 2017 in the assassination of the brother of Kim Jong Un in the international airport at Kuala Lumpur. And of course, the use of novichok by Russian agents in Salisbury, pictured, in 2018 remains an even more recent reminder of the dangers posed by CBRNe threats.
It is not surprising that the total global expenditure on CBRN protection is set to rise from $13 billion in 2023 to over $32B by 2028 and that CBRNe survey analysis and protection, once the preserve of the battlefield is now a frontline capability amongst the first responder organisations of most nations. Fire and recue departments, police services even health providers require sophisticated inventories of detection capabilities able to detect, survey and analysis a wide range of CBRNe threats.
This response to CBRNe threats has caused radiological and chemical detection equipment to come a very long way in capability and connectivity. Hand-held detectors can make detection, survey and analysis with more accuracy, functionality, and utility than ever before, while data transfer allows analysis to be speedily conducted at remote specialist facilities. The US Department of Defense (DoD) program to deliver common equipment and analysis capability across the whole of the Joint Force using a standardised equipment suite is a fearsome example of how seriously governments in both the defence and civil response sectors take the need to have advanced capability. Following the US forces response to the disaster at the Japanese nuclear power plant at Fukushima, major lessons were taken in the standardisation of equipment, development of common joint force doctrine and the improvement of operator and command training in handling CBRNe incidents.
Yet equipment capability forms only part of the challenge to those responsible for the design and maintenance of public safety. Equipment must be matched with user competence and confidence. Survey and analysis must be undertaken in a methodical doctrinal process that is understood and applied to operational response. First responder activities must be planned and coordinated within organisations that can efficiently deploy, control and situations and coordinate survey and analysis data. Most importantly of all the stressful tasks of entering potentially contaminated areas to collect and survey must be trained for by operators who may be entering these dangerous operational environments for the first time.
Yet in the significant sums being allocated to CBRNe defence, less than 2pc is allocated to training systems and equipments. Training is the Cinderella of CBRNe capability. Many organisations use their operational equipment during training, increasing wear and reducing life spans. The use of operational equipment requires complex scenario building that demands the use of live trace agents, a requirement that means training has to take place under controlled regulated conditions likely to reduce scenario realism. The whole process of training preparation and conduct needs planning and control by highly skilled and experienced instructors.
This effort represents an unnecessary burden and much more of the heavy lifting required by training for CBRNe situations could be fulfilled by simulation. This requires those responsible for the acquisition of radiological and chemical detection equipment to consider more actively the training requirement in their procurement programming. Modern detection training simulation equipment can replicate the exact functionality of in-service detection and survey equipments, including their design, weight, carriage and user operation thus allowing training to realistically produce detection and survey data created by inert but safe trace elements and enable more creative and demanding scenario design. Removing the obvious safety restraints of live agents and the wear and tear on operational equipment should make obvious sense, yet possibly for reasons of budgeting and absence of knowledge on equipment manufacturers, the inclusion of simulation appears to fall short of its potential to streamline and advance training.
While the procurement of CBRNe capability no longer sits towards the bottom of the long list of capability requirements, there is still some work to be done in ensuring that advanced training needs are included in acquisition programmes. Given the CBRNe threats that first responder organisations must be prepared to face, simplifying and improving training can only be a good thing.
