Author: David Haas
ISBN No: 9781032523712, paperback
Review date: 16/09/2026
No of pages: 414
Publisher: CRC Press
Publisher URL:
https://www.routledge.com/Personal-Identification-Modern-Development-and-Security-Implications/Haas/p/book/9781032523712
Year of publication: 01/01/2024
Brief:
price
£39.99
While personal identification might sound a dry topic for a book, in the hands of the American author David J Haas, by tracing the evolution of personal identity, he authoritatively describes major social, political, and technological changes.
Like much else in security management, the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 looms large. The official 9/11 Commission Report โdescribed the consequences of a failed national identification systemโ, something that the country had long known about but had let slide. As Haas mentions, Sweden was the first country to institute a number system for its entire population in 1947. The author describes a computer-readable and verifiable document as essential; yet itโs one thing to have an ID to allow you to do the 101 things in everyday life (take money out of your bank account or to apply for credit, and not allow fraudsters to) and another for the state to use that ID to carry out mass surveillance of you and everyone, and to tell you what you can and cannot do.
Haas is wise to โfunction creepโ, that an ID scheme or credential may be hailed for one purpose, and be used for others. For example, the driverโs license (in the United States issued by states, not from the centre federally) was never intended to be an identification document, just a document to show driving skills. As Haas shows, personal identification documents โreally developed out of the necessity to have secure documents and ownership for security purposesโ. โFrom the authorisation badge of the late 1800s to the first photo identification badges of the 1940s, these documents became practical because they possessed a unique appearance, they were restricted from the general public, and they provided data for the only sensor available at these times: the human eye.โ Haas tells us that the age of self-identification is about over. Traditionally, a person would present themselves, and their โbreeder documentsโ, to an agent of government, who made the decision of their identity based on all the data presented. In the 20th century came electronic readers, CCTV systems, and plastic construction materials that made identification more efficient.
Citizens who prize their liberty may be suspicious, as some were of the Labour Governmentโs national ID card of the later 2000s (promptly abolished by the Coalition Government of 2010). After 9-11, the US government spoke of a national identification card for every American citizen. Haas recalls that the American people โeventually saw it for what it was: an attempt to compensate for the failure in security by the state and federal government agencies that led to the 9/11 attacks. IDs, PNs [personal numbers], and national identity cards do not make a nation secure. A nation is made secure by having sensible national policies and motivating its citizens to protect their liberties.โ Yet, as Haas goes on to say, the federal Department of Homeland Security rightly accepted the challenge simply โbecause a trusted and secure ID document for each American citizen is a fundamental premise of risk management and professional security practiceโ. Earlier in the book, Haas sets out the central part played in the development of security management as a trade or profession by the association ASIS, and in particular the ASIS Protection of Assets Manual (POA) and training derived from it. (The manual itself dates from 1965; it identified, pardon the pun, three things about proving an identity โ โsomething an individual knows, something an individual has, and something an individual isโ.)
While Haas acknowledges privacy advocates, he argues that โthe goal of being able to identify who is not an American citizen is essential for proper national protection. Itโs just common sense! The illegal alien problem that we now face is a direct result of this weaknessโ, which we might add brings us back to politics. To return to Haas: โCitizenship imparts many rights and duties on people for the national good, so there is no reason that citizens should not be provided with a 21st-century ID document that is trusted and secure.โ In the United States, thatโs called the REAL ID driverโs license. As in any country, to acquire this trusted ID, your โbreeder documentsโ and the other support material have to be authentic and have true data (such as your birth certificate with the correct name and date of birth). A trusted ID has to be difficult to counterfeit, alter, or forge, Haas explains. This requires a plastic card (or token) with secure authentication features such as digital watermarks and covert codes. Whether digital watermarks or an equivalent feature, each time the ID is machine read, its authenticity should be confirmed to visually demonstrate its validity (and not rely on the human eye).
Some of the American people or their elected representatives have met the โnationally recognised IDโ (Haasโ preferred term) with resistance. Homeland Security had to extend the enforcement deadline multiple times. Tennessee declined to issue REAL ID marked cards until 2019. The very last states and US territory, Oklahoma, Oregon, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not issue REAL ID-compliant identity documents until 2020. As of October 2023, only about 57pc of US citizens and lawful residents possess REAL ID credentials.
While the book by an American author naturally concentrates on the US experience, whatโs set out has its own interest and the underlying ideas apply to the UK or any other country. A code of federal regulations for the REAL ID defines the minimum standards necessary for identification cards being used by US residents for โofficial purposes,โ such as accessing secure federal facilities, boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants. State compliance with those standards is determined by the Department of Homeland Security.
Haas describes the long-term future of passports as โuncertainโ, given citizens of the European Union can cross borders without showing a document or indeed noticing the border is there at all.
Much of the book is given over to the past, which is of human if not immediate interest. Once, visual inspection of letters of introduction, military orders, employment papers, and passports without photographs from any of several countries presented guards (military, at bases, or civilians at gatehouses and doors) with a hopeless task of granting entry permission or not, Haas recalls. Guards usually operated on their โgutโ feeling as the early guard manuals had instructed them to do.
Among the appendices are the Identification Badge Section from the 1941 FBI Manual โProtection of Industrial Facilities (Suggestions for)โ. The White House began employing visual identification passes in 1939, just before the British King and Queenโs Official State Visit. Britain had, Haas writes, already instituted strict personal security protection for the British Government and Royal Officials. The approach and then outbreak of the Second World War drove change, in securing premises besides much else. Companies issued metal badges to their employees, and drew up plant protection procedures. The badges identified who the individual was, and many contained cut-outs for the holderโs photograph. While these badges did not have any security features except their unique design, they were the first step in developing a true photo identification badge, Haas points out. In the US, War Department employees were issued paper identification cards as another security measure (the first Dinerโs Card in 1951, and American Express card in 1958, were cardboard). These cards marked a new concept for the government, and a step in providing some security procedures, Haas writes. However, these identity cards had little or no security features, and they were easily counterfeited. Authorization badges are not identification credentials, because they typically do not have photographs or other biometric data to link the badges to their owners. It was only in 1940 that suitable low-cost laminated identification badges would eventually replace them, and photographs could be inserted easily into laminated badges. By 1960, most lapel authorization badges had been replaced by laminated plastic cards or photo ID badges. Change, we can see, was constant towards the security management still within living memory.
