IFSEC 2008 was the 30th one for Peter Gough, but the first time he had spoken there. The head of security at the National Trust told the event three-day conference how the varied properties and assets are secured against equally varied threats.
Layered security was the watchword for Peter Gough; to detect, deter, and detain. This might include a vibration sensor on a window bar; or electronic security, on a site without electricity! Peter showed a battery-powered device which sends a signal via a mobile phone network. Staff can then dial in to listen to the sound of any attack, and police will accept that as a verified external alarm. He described the trust as a custodian, not only of 300 historic houses and gardens but 49 industrial monuments and mills. There is a responsibility to provide public access to these treasures: "This obviously gives criminals or potential criminals the opportunity to reconnoiter." Besides collections of paintings and sculpture, the items on display can be surprisingly intimate, well within touching distance of any visitor, as Peter showed with one of many slides. The home of Helen Terry had its walls filled with framed works. How to protect these? "Well, firstly we have to identify them, then identify the vulnerability of assets." Is access by vehicle, or on foot? Is the treasure portable? Is the property in a high crime area? What is the likely police response – and some homes are in very remote areas? By easy vehicle access, Peter was thinking of the risk of ram-raids, giving the example of a house in County Wicklow with low steps leading to an entrance. A ram-raid vehicle mounted the steps and hit the door. A Gainsborough painting was stolen. A year later the back door was ram-raided, and five paintings stolen.
Treasures may be outside, too, such as lead statues on terraces. As Peter said, with the scrap value of lead and other metals these days, such statues if stolen may be cut up and totally destroyed, regardless of their value as art. Hence surveys to identify security weaknesses, for instance at window shutters. Peter spoke of using a threat matrix, to show high, medium or low threat levels and vulnerability. Use of such a matrix can help to set priorities, to counter threats and consider how effective existing measures are, whether physical or electronic security, or lighting or procedures or communications. And keep reviewing, he stressed; because threats do change.
Peter gave the example (all with slides to illustrate) of a poor quality lock on a good-quality gate. Or an old padlock, too old for the application. A trust property may be raided just for its plant and equipment. A ride-on lawnmower may cost £15,000. When in store, they can be secured with ‘ground anchors’. These are cast into a concrete floor, when the store is built; and in the day when the mower is in use, the anchor can go below the surface, so that it is not a hazard. Peter gave the example of a gate too narrow for a car to access the rear of a property; but the thieves simply rammed the stone wall to get through the perimeter. Or, items on display may mask indoor detectors. Or, staff may use a fire extinguisher to prop open a door.
Peter spoke of crime prevention in terms of increasing the threat for the criminal; or reducing the benefit; or increasing the risk of the criminal being caught. In a word, target hardening – of display cases for instance. The original glazing may be taken out and anti-bandit glass put in, and locks added, to ‘harden up’ the case. The trust does some product testing, of how well glass resists smashing for instance. And: "There’s no point having a good door with a weak fame." He gave the example of an historic door taken to store; a replica was made with a steel plate and extra locks, to spread the load in any attack. Similarly, shutters are only as strong as their hinges. Shutter bars might have sensors attached, to provide early warning of an intrusion.
As for increasing the threat for the criminal, Peter said: "I firmly believe in video entry phones, rather than just voice; because then you can monitor the number of people that come in on any one entry." He added that it is important to train staff to challenge anyone not wearing an identity badge, on a guided tour for example; and when staff give a guided tour it is important to have besides the guide a ‘sweeper’, (to look for strays).
He spoke of removing inducements to the criminal. So that criminals do not know how to get around a property via the stairs, the trust does not publish detailed house plans. There are regular room checks by staff; and properties prohibit large bags, and photography. Instead, many trust houses have lockers for visitors to leave baggage. As for securing objects, Peter showed a microcable, less than 1mm thick, covered with nylon sheath.
Building work can be a time of insecurity. Generally, the trust will put in movement-operated lighting, but not detection, because, according to Peter, police will certainly not respond out in the country. "I believe in protecting the rooms affected by the scaffolding rather than the route into the building."
The trust seeks to reduce the rewards for the criminal. Out of visiting hours, staff might wheel particularly high-value or easily-portable items into a vault, such as silver cutlery. Or, a property might have replica statues. Property marking makes it more difficult for the criminal to pass on stolen goods. And the trust has inventory photos, with close-ups of unique details, so that if something is stolen, police can see the trust is the owner if property is recovered.
And as for increasing the risk to the criminal, there is entry screening, and proper opening and closing procedures, besides formal surveillance, whether by CCTV or room wardens and guides. Object sensors alert staff that things are being moved – which is important, Peter added, because rooms are shown as if lived in, and everyday objects are loose or anchored using microcable. Staff will look out for odd visitor behaviour in shops, or car parks; and for better natural surveillance, gardeners prune hedges. "We put CCTV into properties mainly for identification purposes, not to look at activities," he explained. "We don’t believe in CCTV in all of the rooms." He showed a slide of a discreetly-installed indoor camera. Peter did speak of selecting the right lens for a camera, to cope with lighting.
Report cards are available to all staff – gardeners, room guides, wardens – as an aide memoire, should they notice anything suspicious. As for communications devices, these can be overt (radio) or discreet (pendants, to alert the duty manager silently). On personal and lone worker safety, Peter suggested working with the health and safety department, to assess and mitigate; to minimise cash holding, for example. He called for proper response planning for all sorts of incidents. And while the trust can spend thousands of pounds on physical and electronic security, if the police do not respond, the trust is lost. Hence some properties have police response plans.
And as for intruder alarms, Peter spoke of keeping the system as simple as possible, ‘because the more sensors you put in, the more there are to go wrong and the greater the cost of the system; so ask your installer the sense of every alarm installed." When choosing an installer, Peter advised taking up references from similar users. Link your alarms, he suggested, with lighting and sounders, for greater effect. Peter showed a slide of deployable lights, that are raised at dusk on a historic building’s roof, to satisfy planners.
Briefly, the National Trust, a charity with some 3.5m members seeks to preserve not just stately homes but coastline and other things for the nation. Peter Gough began work with Group 4 in 1977, involved in access control, intruder alarms and particularly intrusion sensors. He worked with Senstar, and was four years a consultant.
