France is not simply banning US technology in its public sector. It is showing that strategic dependency has become a security, resilience and procurement issue. UK firms working in Europe should expect more questions about data flows, hosting, AI-enabled processing, supplier concentration and exit options. Ellie Hurst, pictured, at the information security awareness consultancy Advent IM goes through what UK businesses working in Europe need to understand.
Franceโs move to shift parts of its public sector away from US technology platforms such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Webex and others is easy to misread. This is not quite the same as France banning every US platform from every organisation. It is more precise, and more useful for UK risk planning, to see it as a public-sector sovereignty move: France wants state communications, collaboration and sensitive public-sector data to sit within tools it can control more directly.
On 26 January 2026, the French Government announced that it would generalise Visio, a secure and sovereign video-conferencing tool developed by the Direction interministรฉrielle du numรฉrique (DINUM), across state services by 2027. The stated objective was to end use of extra-European solutions, guarantee the security and confidentiality of public electronic communications, and make Visio the single video-conferencing tool for state agents. The French announcement explicitly linked the move to digital sovereignty, harmonised office tools and reduced dependency on external platforms. Source: French Government / DINUM.
That distinction matters. So again then, the message from France is not simply that US technology is banned in its public sector. The more important message is that strategic dependency is becoming a security, resilience and procurement issue.
For UK businesses, especially those working with European public sector, defence, health, critical infrastructure, research, legal, finance or regulated markets, this matters because it changes the assurance conversation. It is no longer enough to say a platform is popular, secure, certified or convenient. Customers may increasingly ask who controls it, where the data sits, which laws can reach it, how easy it is to leave, whether AI features are processing meeting content, and whether the service can continue during geopolitical, legal or supplier disruption.
The European direction of travel
France is not operating in a vacuum. Across Europe, digital sovereignty has moved from policy language into procurement and operational decision-making.
The European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2026 on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure. Its focus included reducing strategic dependencies, avoiding over-reliance on foreign actors and single providers, and strengthening Europeโs control over critical technologies and infrastructure. Source: European Parliament.
The European Commission has also started putting sovereignty into cloud procurement more directly. In April 2026, it announced a sovereign cloud procurement framework for EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with up to EUR 180 million available over six years. The Commission said the framework was intended to strengthen the digital sovereignty posture of Union entities and encourage sovereign digital solutions that comply with EU laws and values. Source: European Commission.
This does not mean Europe will move to a blanket ban on all non-European technology. The more likely pattern is selective, risk-based and sector-specific. The highest scrutiny will fall on government, defence, health, justice, research, CNI, data infrastructure and services that handle sensitive citizen, operational or strategic data.
For UK businesses, that is the key point. The issue may not arrive as a loud prohibition. It may arrive quietly inside procurement questions, supplier assurance forms, contractual schedules, data protection impact assessments, security architecture reviews and bid scoring.
Why the UK is unlikely to copy France directly
The UK does not appear to be following the French path in a simple, like-for-like way. The House of Commons Library noted in March 2026 that the UK Government does not have an overarching policy on digital sovereignty, although it has set out approaches to sovereign capability in areas such as AI and key technologies. It also noted that the Government has recognised dependence on a small number of technology suppliers, but has resisted recommendations to explicitly favour British companies in procurements. Source: House of Commons Library.
The UK public sector remains strongly cloud-oriented. The Government Cloud First policy says public sector organisations should default to public cloud first when procuring new or existing services, using other solutions only where this is not possible. This is mandatory for central government and strongly recommended to the wider public sector. Source: GOV.UK.
So the UK is unlikely to say, ‘remove Microsoft Teams and Zoom from public-sector operations’ in the same way France is moving state agents onto Visio. The UK position is more pragmatic, commercially embedded and cloud-first. But that does not mean UK organisations can ignore the shift. The UK may not copy the French model, but UK businesses working in Europe may still have to satisfy European expectations.
In practice, this creates a gap. UK firms may continue using US cloud, collaboration, SaaS and AI-enabled platforms as normal, while some European clients become more cautious about exactly those dependencies. That gap is where commercial friction can appear.
What this means for UK businesses working in Europe
The most immediate impact will be on UK organisations selling into European public sector or regulated markets. A UK supplier bidding into a European ministry, defence body, research organisation, hospital network, public agency or critical infrastructure environment may be asked much sharper questions about its technology stack.
Those questions may include where data is hosted, which cloud services are used, where support staff are based, what subcontractors are involved, whether data can be accessed from outside Europe, what collaboration platforms are used, whether AI features are enabled, and how quickly the supplier could move to a client-approved platform if required.
This does not mean a UK business will automatically be penalised for using Microsoft, Zoom, AWS, Google or other major providers. It does mean ‘we use the same tools as everyone else’ may become a weak assurance answer.
For UK businesses, the commercial risk is not just compliance failure. It is bid weakness. A competitor with a clearer sovereignty, hosting, transfer and exit position may look safer, even if the underlying service is similar.
Collaboration tools may become client-controlled
For day-to-day delivery, one of the most practical impacts will be collaboration. UK firms working with European clients may increasingly need to use the clientโs approved environment rather than assuming everyone will use Teams, Zoom or shared Microsoft 365 spaces.
That could affect consultancy delivery, audits, training, incident response, legal work, managed services, joint bids, defence projects, research collaboration and board-level advisory work. Meetings may need to happen on sovereign video platforms. Documents may need to be exchanged through approved portals. Sensitive workshops may need to avoid unmanaged transcription or recording tools.
That sounds minor, but it changes working practice. It means UK organisations need staff who can follow client handling instructions, avoid convenience workarounds, and understand why ‘just send it over Teams’ may not be acceptable in some European environments. For GRC teams, this is a clear control issue. Policies, acceptable use rules, supplier onboarding and project kick-off processes need to recognise that collaboration tooling is no longer just an IT preference. It can be a client assurance requirement.
Data transfers and onward transfers will need better evidence
From a data protection perspective, the UK is in a relatively favourable position because the European Commission renewed the UK adequacy decisions in December 2025. The ICO states that the amended decisions that were adopted on 19 December 2025, apply to personal information transferred from the EEA to the whole of the UK, and last until 27 December 2031. Source: ICO; European Commission.
However, that does not answer every question. The issue for many European customers will not simply be ‘can data move from the EU to the UK?’ It will be ‘what happens after the UK supplier receives it?’
If the UK supplier then processes that data in a US-hosted SaaS platform, gives support access to a non-European subcontractor, stores recordings in a global cloud environment, or enables AI transcription and summarisation, the assurance question becomes more complicated.
The ICOโs guidance on international transfers is a useful reminder that organisations need to identify whether a restricted transfer is taking place and what mechanism supports it. The ICO also points to the need to map contracts and personal information flows, and to use adequacy regulations, appropriate safeguards or an exception where a restricted transfer is made. Source: ICO.
So for UK businesses working in Europe, the practical task is to map data flows properly. That includes customer data, personal data, metadata, meeting recordings, transcripts, audit logs, support access, telemetry, backups and AI-generated outputs.
AI makes this more complicated
This issue is not just about video calls and cloud hosting. Collaboration platforms are increasingly AI-enabled. Teams, Zoom, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365 and similar environments are becoming knowledge processing platforms. They can record, transcribe, summarise, classify, search and generate content from business communications.
Franceโs own Visio platform is not presented as a low-function alternative. The French Governmentโs announcement says Visio includes AI transcription using speaker separation technology developed by French startup Pyannote, and real-time subtitling is planned by summer 2026 using technology developed by the French AI research laboratory Kyutai. Source: French Government / DINUM.
That matters because AI changes the assurance question. It is no longer enough to know where a document is stored. Organisations also need to know whether meeting content is transcribed, whether summaries are generated, where prompts and outputs sit, whether metadata is retained, whether content is used to improve services, whether administrators can access transcripts, and whether AI features can be disabled for sensitive clients.
For UK firms, this is where AI governance becomes part of European market readiness. ISO/IEC 42001-style controls, AI acceptable use rules, DPIAs, supplier due diligence and clear configuration records are not just internal hygiene. They become evidence that the business understands how AI changes information risk.
The impact on CNI, defence and government suppliers
The highest impact will be felt by UK businesses working in or around CNI, defence, public sector, data centres, MSPs and other high-trust environments.
The UKโs own regulatory direction is already moving towards stronger resilience expectations. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will bring medium and large managed service providers who meet the definition of a relevant managed service provider into scope of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. GOV.UK states that these providers will be required to have appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks and report significant incidents. Source: GOV.UK.
The same factsheet notes that MSPs often have unprecedented access to clientsโ IT systems, including networks, infrastructure and data. It also references the May 2024 incident involving an MSP that enabled hackers to target the Ministry of Defence payroll, putting the personal data of around 270,000 serving military personnel, reservists and veterans at high risk. Source: GOV.UK.
The Bill will also bring data centres into scope by classifying data infrastructure as a relevant sector and data centres as an essential service. Source: GOV.UK.
That is highly relevant to this European sovereignty discussion. The UK may not be using the same language as France, but it is also recognising that digital service dependencies are now national resilience issues. For CNI, government and defence, the question is not just whether a platform is secure in ordinary conditions. It is whether the organisation can continue operating if a supplier changes terms, a foreign jurisdiction asserts legal reach, an AI feature changes data handling, a major provider suffers an outage, or geopolitical conditions affect service availability.
For defence suppliers in particular, this becomes part of mission assurance. Sensitive collaboration, operational data, programme information, supplier records and incident communications need to be handled in ways that can withstand scrutiny.
Supplier assurance will become more detailed
UK businesses working in Europe should expect due diligence questions to become more granular. A few years ago, a supplier assurance questionnaire might have focused on ISO 27001, cyber insurance, incident response and penetration testing. Those still matter, but sovereignty-aware assurance will go further.
Customers may ask for evidence of hosting location, administrative access controls, encryption and key management, subprocessors, support locations, lawful access risk assessment, portability, exit planning, platform concentration risk, AI feature governance, logging and monitoring, incident notification routes, and client data segregation.
This is especially important where a UK firm is itself a managed service provider, consultancy, legal adviser, auditor, SaaS provider, data processor, AI provider or technical integrator. These organisations often sit close to sensitive client information and may have privileged access. That is exactly where sovereignty and resilience questions become more intense. The key commercial point is simple: the supplier with the clearest evidence pack will look less risky.
A practical response for UK businesses
UK firms do not need to panic or rip out their technology stack. That would be expensive, disruptive and often unnecessary. But they do need a defensible position.
A sensible approach starts with classification. Not every meeting, document or project needs sovereign tooling. A routine commercial update is not the same as a defence programme review, a public-sector incident response meeting, a health data workshop or a regulated infrastructure risk assessment.
The better model is tiered control. Low-sensitivity work may remain on standard commercial platforms. Moderate-sensitivity work may require tighter access controls, no unmanaged AI features, approved data locations and documented subprocessors. High-sensitivity work may need client-controlled platforms, sovereign hosting, restricted recording and enhanced contractual terms. Very high-sensitivity work may need explicit approval before any external SaaS is used.
UK businesses should also prepare a short digital sovereignty and resilience statement for European bids. This should explain the organisationโs approach to data location, suppliers, subprocessors, international transfers, AI-enabled processing, platform exit, incident response and client-controlled environments. It does not need to be theatrical. In fact, it is better if it is calm, evidence-based and practical. The aim is not to claim that every tool is sovereign. The aim is to show that the business understands dependency risk and governs it properly.
The board-level issue
At board level, this is about dependency risk. The old question was: ‘Is this platform secure?’ The better question now is: ‘Are we comfortable with the level of control we have over the platforms that carry our most sensitive work?’
That includes control over data, access, configuration, support, AI processing, contractual terms, continuity, exit and evidence. It also includes knowing where the business is exposed to single-provider dependency. For UK businesses working in Europe, this should be treated as a market access issue as well as a security issue. European digital sovereignty may affect procurement, contract negotiation, due diligence, delivery methods and customer confidence.
The UK may not follow France with direct restrictions on US collaboration platforms, but UK firms cannot assume European customers will take the same view. Franceโs move is a signal. The European Commissionโs cloud procurement work is another signal. The European Parliamentโs language on strategic dependency is another. Together, they show that digital sovereignty is moving from policy debate into operational reality.
Franceโs move away from US collaboration platforms in parts of its public sector should not be dismissed as protectionism or overreaction. It is part of a wider European shift towards control, resilience and reduced strategic dependency.
For UK businesses, the risk is not that every European customer will suddenly ban Teams, Zoom or Microsoft 365. The more realistic risk is that European customers, especially in sensitive sectors, will expect better answers about data flows, hosting, onward transfers, AI-enabled processing, supplier concentration and exit options.
The organisations that prepare now will be better placed to bid, reassure and deliver. The ones that wait until a procurement questionnaire asks the awkward question may find themselves scrambling. The practical message is this: digital sovereignty is not just a technology preference. It is becoming a governance, resilience and assurance issue. For UK businesses working in Europe, that makes it a commercial issue too.
Practical checklist for UK businesses
Sources
French Government / DINUM: Visio announcement: https://www.numerique.gouv.fr/sinformer/espace-presse/souverainete-numerique-etat-visio-solution-visioconference-agents-publics/
French Ministry of Economy: Visio press release: https://presse.economie.gouv.fr/?p=169175
La Suite Numerique: Visio product page: https://lasuite.numerique.gouv.fr/produits/visio
French public-sector Visio description: https://spote.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/offre/visio-l-outil-de-visioconference-des-agents-publics
European Commission: Cloud sovereignty through strategic procurement: https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/commission-advances-cloud-sovereignty-through-strategic-procurement-2026-04-17_en
European Commission Digital Strategy: sovereign cloud tender: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/nl/news/commission-awards-eu180-million-tender-sovereign-cloud-four-european-providers
European Parliament: technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure: https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/document-summary?id=1884418
House of Commons Library: Digital sovereignty: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10547/
UK Government Cloud First policy: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/government-cloud-first-policy
European Commission: UK adequacy decision press corner: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_3059
ICO: Receiving personal information from the EEA: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/international-transfers/receiving-personal-information-from-the-eea/
ICO: Brief guide to international transfers: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/international-transfers/a-brief-guide-to-international-transfers/
UK Government Cyber Security and Resilience Bill factsheet: relevant managed service providers: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-network-and-information-systems-bill-factsheets/relevant-managed-service-providers
UK Government Cyber Security and Resilience Bill factsheet: data centres: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-network-and-information-systems-bill-factsheets/data-centres
