LPS 1175, the physical security standard, tests products against defined toolkits, not the tools most likely to be used by criminals using more advanced technology, says Richard Hilson, pictured, of PFL – Access Management. He argues that as lithium batteries put professional-grade cutting capability into the hands of a criminal for under ยฃ200, the gap between what certification assures and what real-world security demands has never been wider.
As physical security tests go, LPS 1175 is, without question, one of the toughest. Under Issue 8, a product is assessed against a two-part rating – a letter from A to H denoting the toolkit used, and a number from 1 to 20 denoting the delay, in minutes, it must hold against an attacker using that toolkit. However, the overwhelming majority of products (95 per cent) submitted for certification fail on the first attempt.
That’s genuinely rigorous, and none of what follows is meant to diminish it, but thereโs merit in examining further what that covers, especially in 2026. The Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB) tests a single product – such as a gate, a fence panel, a shutter, or a grille – in a controlled laboratory, against a fixed toolkit, for a fixed period. What that doesn’t do, is assess your perimeter as installed, which may be worn by years of use, and attacked by someone who’s done their homework rather than turned up cold.
The problem with the toolkitย ย
Every toolkit in the matrix is a snapshot of what was available to criminals when the standard, or its most recent revision – Issue 8 – was written in 2019. Issue 8 exists because Issue 7, written in 2010, dealt with toolkits that had fallen behind the cordless, battery-powered tools actually turning up at site perimeters. This was a genuine improvement, but standards are invariably backward-looking, while the toolkit, and the criminal, has moved on somewhat.
Enter lithium battery technology, where we see a cordless angle grinder that once needed a mains supply now fitting in a rucksack, and can be bought on the high street for well under ยฃ200. Thatโs not what Issue 8 had in mind seven years ago. The challenge for security standards is that criminal capability can evolve almost immediately, while formal testing standards move through a longer cycle of consultation, validation and revision.
Police investigations into commercial burglaries are increasingly referencing portable angle grinders being used to break perimeter security. In January 2026, Hampshire Police reported that offenders had used an angle grinder to force entry through fencing at a business premises in Eastleigh before stealing six micro excavators.ย Likewise, Avon & Somerset Police now specifically warn construction businesses that the increased availability of battery-powered cordless angle grinders is contributing to more attempts by criminals to break through site security measures, including locks and storage units.
This aligns with BauWatch’s 2025 crime report, which found two-thirds of construction and infrastructure professionals had seen crime rise on their sites, with small tools and power tools the most commonly stolen category, costing the industry close to ยฃ100m a year.
A product holding an LPS 1175 rating tells you that specific item, tested in isolation, met a specific bar. The standard evaluates the product as a whole, including hardware and fixings, but that assessment stops at the edge of the tested unit. Everything else – specification, installation, how the layers interact – is down to whoever built the perimeter. To me that suggests a brilliant product badly integrated is not a brilliant perimeter.
Defining delay, detection and response
Iโm not against certification – I’m just arguing that certification doesnโt solve the whole problem as the whole answer. Delay is only part of it, alongside detection and response, and a perimeter is only as good as its weakest link. A barrier delivering a ten-minute delay is worth little if nobody notices the attack until minute eight, and worth less still if the response takes 15 minutes to arrive. Experience shows that deterrence comes from convincing an attacker that risk and effort outweigh reward.
So where does that leave the person specifying a perimeter? I’d argue they need to ask a different question. Not “what rating does this product hold?” but “will this perimeter, as specified and installed, actually stop or delay the attempted attack, with the tools realistically available today?” That’s harder, and has no tidy answer printed on a certificate.
It requires an honest conversation about current toolkits rather than historic ones, the perimeter as an installed system rather than a catalogue of certified parts, and detection and response as genuine partners to delay. LPS 1175 remains the best tool we have for benchmarking product performance, and I’d never advise a client to specify against anything less. But ratings are set against yesterdayโs threats, and those intent on gaining entry have a whole new set of tools in their armoury.
